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THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
OF EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM UNDER
THE CHARTER©
BY JAMIE CAMERON*
More than ten years have passed since the Supreme
Court of Canada's first interpretation of the Charter's
guarantee of expressive freedom in RWDSU v. Dolphin
Delivery. This review of the past, present, and future of
expressive freedom under the Charter is in three parts.
The first-dealing with the past-traces the evolution
of a methodology of expressive freedom in the "first
generation" of s. 2(b) jurisprudence. It is followed by
an examination of the status of expressive freedom at
present, through comments on recent Supreme Court
landmarks in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, and RIR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.). The third part
proposes a methodology for the future, which would
enhance the Charters protection of expressive freedom
by grounding the s. 1 analysis in a framework of
principle.
Plus d'une dizaine d'anndes se sont 6coulees depuis
l'arrdt sGDmR c. Dolphin Delivery, dans lequel la Cour
supreme du Canada a interprt6 pour la premiere fois
la garantie de la libert6 expressive accord6e par la
Charte. Cette revue du pass6, du present, et de l'avenir
de la libert6 expressive garantie par la Charte, est
examinee en trois parties. La premiere, en rapport
avec le pass6, retrace l'6volution d'une methode
d'analyse de la libert6 d'expressive selon la
jurisprudence de la a premiere g6neration, de l'al 2(b).
Cette partie est suivie par un examen du statut actuel
de la libert6 expressive, A travers les commentaires de
reperes recents 6tablis par la Cour supreme dans
Dagenais c. Societd Radio-Canada, Hill c. Eglise de
scientoogie de Toronto, ainsi que PjR-MacDonald Inc. c.
Canada (P.G.). La derni~re partie visant l'avenir,
propose une m6thodologie qui pourrait am6liorer la
protection de la libert6 expressive garantie par la
Charte tout en basant l'analyse premier sur des regles
de principe.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A jurisprudence on expressive freedom evolved quickly following
the Supreme Court of Canada's first interpretation of section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 in RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery.2
Since 1986, the Court has considered limits on offensive
communications, including hate propaganda,3 obscenity,4 and the
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11
[hereinafter Charter]. The section provides as follows: "Everyone has the following fundamental
freedoms: ... (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication .... "
2 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery] (protecting labour picketing under s. 2(b)
of the Charter).
3 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra]; and R. v. Andrews, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
870 (upholding s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46).
4 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter Butler] (upholding the definition of obscenity
under s. 163(8) of the Criminal Code).
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solicitation of sex,5 and addressed the constitutionality of restrictions on
false,6 libellous7 and discriminatory8 expression. The emerging case law
has discussed the status of commercial9  and political
expression,0including compelled messagesllexamined the principle of
openness in judicial and other public proceedings 1 2 set limits on the
5 Reference Re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 [hereinafter
Prostitution Reference]; R. v. Stagnitta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1226; and R v. Skinner, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235
(upholding the Criminal Code's solicitation provisions).
6 R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 [hereinafter Zundel] (invalidating s. 183 of the Criminal
Code prohibiting the wilful spreading of false news); Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995]
2 S.C.R. 1130 [hereinafter Scientology] (holding that s. 2(b) of the Charter does not alter the
common law of defamation); and Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd., [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3
[hereinafter Botiuk] (upholding a verdict and award for damages for libel).
7 Scientology, supra note 6; and Botiuk, supra note 6.
8 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (upholding a human
rights complaint about hateful telephone messages); and Ross. v. New Brunswick School District No.
15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [hereinafter Ross] (upholding a discrimination complaint arising from a
schoolteacher's off-duty anti-Semitic expressive activity).
9 Ford. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford], and Devine v.Quebec (A.G.),
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 790 (invalidating English language advertising restrictions); Irwin Toy v.Quebec
(A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter Invin Toy] (upholding restrictions on advertising aimed at
children); Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter
Rocket] (invalidating restrictions on professional advertising); and PJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada
(A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter PaR-MacDonald] (invalidating restrictions on tobacco
advertising and mandatory cigarette package warnings).
10 Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69 (invalidating restrictions on
partisan activities by public servants); Lavigne v. oPSEU, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [hereinafter Lavigne]
(upholding the use of compelled union dues for political and ideological purposes); New Brunswick
Broadcasting Co. v.Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 [hereinafter
Nova Scotia] (dismissing a claim of access to a provincial legislative assembly by a television station);
and Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 (dismissing the right of a citizen to
vote in a referendum as an element of expressive freedom under s. 2(b)).
11 Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [hereinafter Slaight] (upholding
limits on an employer's expressive freedom and compelling an employer to provide a reference
letter of specified contents to a former employee); Lavigne, supra note 10; and RIR-MacDonald,
supra note 9.
12 Canadian Newspapers v. Canada (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 (upholding a ban on
publication of complainants' identities in sexual assault cases); Edmonton Journal v.Alberta (A.G.),
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 [hereinafter Edmonton Journal] (invalidating a statutory ban on the publication
of certain civil proceedings); Vickery v.Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary) [1991] 1 S.C.R.
671 [hereinafter ickety] (denying press access, at common law, to a taped confession) ; Dagenais v.
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 [hereinafter Dagenais] (invalidating a publication
ban); Nova Scotia, supra note 10; Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R.
627 [hereinafter NwVAC] (dismissing a claim of access to constitutional negotiations); and R. v.
Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707 (establishing conditions for the revocation of publication orders with
respect to the identity of sexual assault complainants).
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availability of publication bans,13 pondered the role of the press,14 and
explored the scope of access to government property under section
2(b).15 In such circumstances, it should be of little surprise that the
jurisprudence thus far has been mixed: though expressive freedom has
prevailed in important cases, the infringements saved still outnumber, by
some margin, those that have been struck down.16 Issues that raised
questions of first impression also challenged the Court to develop a
conception of expressive freedom under the Charter., If it is premature
to expect a theory of expression, it is surely not too soon to reflect on the
first generation of section 2(b) jurisprudence and to look to the future.
Like other Charter guarantees, section 2(b) can claim an
auspicious beginning. The holding in Dolphin Delivery that labour
picketing is a protected form of expression under the Charter was
followed by Irwin Toy v. Quebec (A.G.) and a definition of expression as
all activity that attempts to convey meaning.17 Ironically, however, a
generous reading of section 2(b) expanded the role of section l's
concept of justification and set a certain dynamic in motion.1 8 After
defining the right broadly, the Court in Irwin Toy immediately relaxed
the requirements of the section 1 test first set out in R. v. Oakes.19
13 Edmonton Journal, supra note 12; and Dagenais, supra note 12.
14 Edmonton Journal, supra note 12; Dagenais, supra note 12 ; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v.
Lessard, 11991] 3 S.C.R. 421 [hereinafter Lessard], and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New
Brunswick (A.G.), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 [hereinafter New Brunswick] (rejecting the claim that s. 2(b)
protects the press from search warrants); and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (A.G.)
(Re: R. v. Carson), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 [hereinafter Carson] (upholding s. 486(1) of the Criminal
Code but invalidating the exclusion order as an unjustifiable infringement of s. 2(b) in the
circumstances).
15 Canada v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter
Commonwealth] (invalidating restrictions on access to a public airport); Nova Scotia, supra note 10;
Peterborough (City) v. Ramsden, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 [hereinafter Ramsden] (invalidating
restrictions on access to public property); andivWAc, supra note 12.
16 Important s. 2(b) decisions include Ford, supra note 9; Rocket, supra note 9; R-MacDonald,
supra note 9; Zundel, supra note 6; Edmonton Journal, supra note 12; and Dagenais, supra note 12.
Limits have been upheld in cases that include Irwin Toy, supra note 9; Keegstra, supra note 3; Butler,
supra note 4; Lavigne, supra note 10; Slaight, supra note 11; Scientology, supra note 6; Lessard, supra
note 14; and New Brunswick, supra note 14.
1 7 See text accompanying note 38, infra.
18 Section 1 of the Charter, known as the "limitation clause," provides as follows: "The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."
19 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-40 [hereinafter Oakes]. In order to justify a limit on a Charter
right, the state must first point to an objective that is sufficiently pressing and substantial. The
limitation must then pass a three-step proportionality test: the limit must be rationally connected to
[VOL 35 NO. I
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Shortly thereafter, Wilson J. proposed in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta
(A.G.) that the Court adopt a "contextual approach" to the balancing of
values under section 1.20 A simple principle of interpretation that was
introduced in concurring reasons quickly became the mainstay of a
methodology which is now firmly entrenched in precedent.
Leaving the results of particular cases aside, the methodology of
section 2(b) adjudication is troubling and problematic. The foundation
of that methodology is the contextual approach, which has emasculated
Irwin Toy's inclusive definition of the right and transformed section 1
review into an ad hoc exercise that exalts flexibility at the expense of
principle. In the years since Dolphin Delivery, section 2(b)'s values have
increasingly been compromised by a lack of structure, principle, and
consistency in the analysis. Today, Irwin Toy's principle of expressive
freedom is little more than an empty gesture. The jurisprudence
reached that point by marginalizing expressive freedom through a
methodology that itself reflects a limited conception of the right and its
values.
Exploring that relationship, or symbiosis, between section 2(b)'s
values and the Court's methodology is the central purpose of this article.
Part II discusses the early jurisprudence and its struggle to reconcile the
Court's definition of the right with a conception of reasonable limits
under section 1. After considering the impact of Irwin Toy and tracing
the development of the contextual approach, the article explains how the
methodology that crystallized in Keegstra2l skewed the Charter's equation
of rights and limits. Part III of the article traces the progress of that
methodology in three key decisions, each of which invited the Supreme
Court to consider the Charter's guarantee of expressive freedom in a
distinctive context.2 2 Although the claim prevailed twice, these cases
demonstrate that the right cannot be protected by a flawed
methodology, and likewise that a sound methodology cannot emerge
from a flawed conception of the right. The Court's fundamental
ambivalence toward expressive freedom is confirmed in a brief review of
two more recent decisions which also mark Mr. Justice La Forest's
emergence as the Court's leader on these issues.23
the objective; the limit must be the least rights-impairing method of achieving the objective; and the
deleterious effects of the limit on the right must not be disproportionate to the beneficial effects of
achieving the objective.
20 See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
21 Supra note 3.
22 Dagenais, supra note 12 (publication bans); Scientology, supra note 6 (defamation); and PrR-
MacDonald, supra note 9 (tobacco advertising).
23 Ross, supra note 8; and Carson, supra note 14.
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The Court has spoken of a "delicate balance"24 and a "synergetic
relation" under section 1.25 In that regard, it is important to note that
the Charter's dynamic of rights and limits is structural as well as
substantive. Structurally, the two sides of the equation are set apart and
then reconciled, as a matter of substantive law, through a balancing of
values that establishes equilibrium under section 1. The first three parts
of the article conclude that the search for equilibrium in the first
generation of jurisprudence was compromised by a methodology that is
structurally and substantively unsound. Although the discussion is
critical, it identifies the building blocks that can provide a foundation for
section 2(b)'s evolution in the next generation of jurisprudence.
Drawing on those building blocks, Part IV explains how the Court's
methodology could be modified, both to achieve stronger protection for
expressive freedom and to promote principled decisionmaking under
section 1 in the future.
Before proceeding, it should be acknowledged that consensus on
difficult questions about expressive freedom cannot realistically be
achieved. Although this article defends a balance that prefers freedom
over regulation in most cases, its purposes are as focused on the
methodology of Charter interpretation as on the way in which values are
balanced in particular cases. As is suggested below, a "methodology for
the future" would incorporate the following changes: first, the
introduction of two presumptions in favour of expressive freedom under
section 1; second, adjustments to the Oakes test; and third, a
reconceptualization of the role that the contextual approach plays in the
section 1 analysis.
It is inevitable that perceptions of the Charter's equilibrium will
vary from case to case and issue to issue. In such circumstances, the first
and foremost goal of the article is to propose a framework of principle to
guide the jurisprudence in the next generation and, in doing so, to
ground shifting perceptions of equilibrium in a structure of analysis.
2 4 puR-MacDonaMd, supra note 9 at 270.
25 Keegstra, supra note 3 at 737.
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II. THE FIRST GENERATION
A. Evolution of a Methodology
Textually, the Charter's integrity rests on a principle of
equilibrium between its rights and freedoms, and those limits that are
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 26 The source
of that equilibrium is section 1 and its mandate to set "reasonable limits"
on constitutional rights. The concept of reasonable limits is regarded as
a stroke of genius because it acknowledges, in explicit terms, that rights
cannot be absolutely protected. Through an equation that attained
balance between the Charter's guarantees and its democratic values,
Canada hoped to avoid the contradictions of American doctrine. In the
United States, certain categories of speech were excluded from the First
Amendment because limitations were impossible to reconcile with the
text's absolute prohibition on abridgments of free speech.27 Hence the
fiction that obscenity, libel, and fighting words-each of which is
undeniably expressive-do not constitute "speech" under the First
Amendment.28 Restricting the right would not be necessary in Canada
because reasonable limits on expressive freedom can be saved under
section 1.29
Yet, in balancing the equation so evenly, the Charter failed to
indicate how the tension between its rights and limits should be resolved.
Unlike the United States Constitution, which unequivocally favours
expressive rights, the Charter shows no preference for either side of the
equation; nor does it address the relationship between the two. As a
result, one of the most difficult questions the Supreme Court of Canada
considered in the early years of Charter interpretation was whether the
2 6 Supra note 18.
27 U.S. Const. amend. I [hereinafter First Amendment]. The text of the First Amendment
states, in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech...."
28 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (excluding the lewd, the obscene, the
profane, the libellous, and the insulting or "fighting words" from the First Amendment) has been
modified by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter Sullivan] and the principle
of content neutrality. See generally B.J. Cameron, "The First Amendment and Section 1 of the
Charter" (1990) 1 M.C.L.R. 59 [hereinafter "First Amendment and Section 1"] (analyzing the
evolution of First Amendment doctrine and relating it to the Charter's concepts of breach and
justification).
29 See J. Cameron, "The Original Conception of Section 1 and its Demise: A Comment on
Invin Toy v.Attomey-General of Quebec" (1989) 35 McGill L.J. 253 at 257-60 (explaining the theory
of s. 1 and its implications for the scope of the Charter's rights and freedoms).
1997]
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guarantees could be restricted or whether limits could only be imposed
under section 1. Despite the existence of section 1, the latter view was
problematic; as a matter of instinct it seemed unavoidable that shifting
too much analysis onto one side would upset the balance of the
equation. In that regard, section 15 appeared symptomatic. The
suggestion that every distinction between individuals is prima facie in
breach of the Charter's guarantee of equality30 not only threatened to
dwarf the Charter's other rights and freedoms but meant, in addition,
that virtually all legislation would have to be saved under section 1.31 At
the time, the Court was committed to a strict standard of review under
Oakes.32 The perception that a generous conception of equality could
not coexist with a rigorous section 1 test prompted the Court to restrict
the scope of section 15 inAndrews.33
One of the early debates under section 2(b) was whether the
Charter's guarantee of expressive freedom should be confined to political
expression 3 4 The Court's decision in Dolphin Delivery rejected the
suggestion that labour picketing is conduct rather than expression and,
in doing so, protected activity which was unquestionably more economic
than political.35 In addition, McIntyre J. stated that section 2(b) would
not include threats or acts of violence, property destruction, assault, or
"other clearly unlawful conduct." 36 The Court's conclusion under
section 32, that the Charter did not apply to a dispute between purely
private parties, rendered Dolphin Delivery's comments about the scope
of expressive freedom gratuitous. A "methodology" for section 2(b)
issues evolved in four "turning point" decisions: Irwin Toy; Edmonton
Journal; Rocket, and Keegstra.
30 See, for example, P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1985) at 800 (arguing that s. 15 should be interpreted as providing for the universal application of
every law and that s. 1 provides the only standard of justification).
31 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 179-83 [hereinafter
Andrews], McIntyre J., quoting McLachlin J.A. (as she then was) in the same case at the British
Columbia Court of Appeal: (1986), 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 305 at 312-13.
32 Supra note 19.
33 Supra note 31 (rejecting the same treatment test and defining inequality more narrowly as
discrimination on the enumerated or on analogous grounds).
34 See, for example, Re Klein and Law Society of Upper Canada; Re Dvorak and Law Society of
Upper Canada (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 118 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Re Klein] (holding that political
expression is the principal, if not exclusive, function of s. 2(b)).
35 See Ford, supra note 9 at 764 (citing Dolphin Delivery, supra note 2 for the proposition that s.
2(b) is not confined to political expression and can be extended to expression having an economic
purpose).
36 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 2 at 588.
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B. Step One: Irwin Toy's Principle of Freedom
Despite its dicta about the scope of section 2(b), the Supreme
Court of Canada in Dolphin Delivery did not consider whether it would
devalue the Charter's aspirations and ideals to protect obscenity, hate
propaganda, commercial expression, and other forms of "valueless"
expression. Only a few months after Andrews limited the scope of
section 15, the Court gave section 2(b) a generous interpretation. To
some extent, the foundation had been laid in Ford, which confirmed the
Court's commitment to a large and liberal conception of the Charter and
added English language advertising to section 2(b)'s embryonic list of
protected activity.37 In Irwin Toy the Court held in broad, abstract terms
that activity which intends to convey a meaning is prima facie protected
by section 2(b) and proposed an unqualified principle of freedom, that
"everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all
expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or
contrary to the mainstream."38 By declaring that "we prize a diversity of
ideas ... for their inherent value," the Court effectively rejected the
distinction between valuable and valueless expression. 39
Curiously, Irwin Toy never explained why section 2(b) should be
interpreted more generously than section 15, or discussed the concerns
that affected the Court's decision to restrict the scope of equality.
Although it failed to consider how an unlimited definition of expressive
freedom might affect the relationship between section 2(b) and section
1, the Court quickly discovered that an expansive definition of the right
had unavoidable consequences for section 1. The facts of Irwin Toy
confirmed that a broad interpretation of the guarantee could not coexist
with a literal application of Oakes, at least not unless the Court was
prepared to invalidate virtually all restrictions on expressive freedom. In
the circumstances, Quebec's prohibition on children's advertising could
not easily be sustained without adjusting the standard of review under
section 1. To keep the equation in balance, the majority opinion relaxed
the Oakes test.
3 7 Supra note 9.
38 Supra note 9 at 986 [emphasis added]. The Court's definition of expressive freedom was
subject to an exception for violent forms of expression and the addition of a second, "purpose-
effects" test. Its two-step test is summarized ibid. at 971-73.
39 Ibid. at 968. At issue was the validity of a Quebec law that banned all commercial
advertising aimed at children under thirteen years of age. See Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q.
1977, c. P-40.1, ss. 248, 249 and regulations thereunder.
1997]
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By establishing a low threshold of breach, Irwin Toy placed
pressure on section 1 and the Oakes test, thereby threatening the kind of
disequilibrium Andrews had foreseen, and countered by reading section
15 down. Irwin Toy chose a different route: instead of narrowing the
scope of section 2(b), the Court proposed strict and deferential branches
of the Oakes test. By that route, a rigorous approach is appropriate, as
per Oakes, when the state acts as the singular antagonist of an individual,
as it does in criminal proceedings. 40 Otherwise, a more deferential
conception of justification, based on a standard of reasonableness, is
indicated when the legislature seeks to protect the vulnerable or make
difficult decisions about the allocation of scarce resources.41 Although
Quebec's advertising law was saved under the latter approach, McIntyre
J. complained in dissent that "[no] case has been shown that" children
suffer harm from advertising, and declared that a total prohibition aimed
at those below an "arbitrarily fixed age makes no attempt at the
achievement of proportionality."42 The majority opinion replied that the
courts should not second guess any "reasonable assessment as to where
the line [between permissible and impermissible children's advertising] is
most properly drawn."43
Irwin Toy's definition of expression also had significant but
unforeseen consequences for section 2(b) and its role in the analysis.
Ironically, and perhaps by accident, the Court's generous interpretation
of the guarantee rendered its underlying values'irrelevant. In building a
foundation for section 2(b), Dolphin Delivery, Ford, and Irwin Toy
explained that expressive freedom is prized because it promotes values
of democratic government, truth-seeking, and self-realization. Against
decisions like Re Klein,4 4 the rhetoric of those cases signalled the
Supreme Court's intention to grant expressive freedom strong protection
under the Charter. By including all attempts to convey meaning,
however, Irwin Toy truncated the entitlement side of the equation and
inadvertently excluded the right's underlying values from the analysis.
Despite uncertainty about its violent forms exception and purpose-effect
distinction, Irwin Toy effectively reduced breach to a question of fact
40 Ibid. at 993-94.
4 1 Ibi at 986-91 (applying a standard of reasonableness to the requirement of a pressing and
substantial objective), and at 992-99 (substituting reasonableness for the Oakes requirement of
minimal impairment).
42 Ibid. at 1007-08.
43 Ibid. at 990.
4 4 Supra note 34.
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which simply asks whether activity is sufficiently communicative to be
considered expression under section 2(b).
Rationales which were not determinative on the issue of breach
could still play a role in the analysis under section 1. Earlier, Ford had
noted that expressive freedom's values are formulated in a philosophical
context that "fuses" questions of entitlement and limits, which, under the
Charter's structure of rights and limits, are "two distinct questions and
call for two distinct analytical processes."45 Ford resolved that structural
problem by declaring that it is "within the perimeters of s. 1 that courts
will in most instances weigh competing values ... ,"46 Given that the
Oakes test was designed to test the justifiability of the violation-not to
balance values-whether and how section 2(b)'s rationales could be
incorporated into section 1 was a mystery. Although Irwin Toy followed
Ford's lead in interpreting the right generously as a matter of substantive
law, it failed to fit its values into the Charter's structure of analysis.
Irwin Toy and Oakes resulted in the creation of abstract
standards that provided little or no guidance for resolving concrete
questions about the scope of expressive freedom. In addition, Ford
separated the two sides of the equation and then neglected to indicate
how they might be brought together. Finally, Irwin Toy's unqualified
definition of the right created a further complication: the suggestion that
all expressive activity is inherently valuable conferred a kind of
absoluteness on section 2(b) that made weighing other values against it
potentially awkward. Rather than solve those problems, the majority
upheld the prohibition on children's advertising by lowering the standard
of review under section 1. In the circumstances, McIntyre J.'s remark
that the Court's decision represented a "small abandonment of a
principle," but one of vital importance, would be prescient.4 7 Despite
reading section 2(b) more generously than section 15, the Supreme
Court of Canada was profoundly ambivalent about expressive freedom.
That ambivalence set the pattern for the subsequent jurisprudence.
45 Supra note 9 at 765-66.
4 6 Ibid. at 766.
47 Invin Toy, supra note 9 at 1008. He also declared that the principle that freedom of
expression should not be suppressed, "except in cases where urgent and compelling reasons exist,
and then only to the extent and for the time necessary for the protection of the community": ibid at
1009.
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C. Step Two: Context and the Balancing of Values
Irwin Toy volunteered a definition of expression and modified
the Oakes test without providing a blueprint for section 2(b)
adjudication. Although all expressive activity was prima facie protected,
the scope of Irwin Toy's exclusionary criteria remained unclear, and with
only Dickson C.J., Wilson and Lamer JJ. signing the opinion, it was
speculative whether a majority of the Court would endorse Irwin Toy's
methodology.48 Only a few months later, in Edmonton Journal,49 Wilson
J. offered an alternative to Irwin Toy's section 1 analysis, which was
subsequently endorsed by the Court in Rocket.5O
The issue in Edmonton Journal was whether a statutory ban on
the publication of information relating to matrimonial proceedings was
justifiable. The legislation created a conflict between open justice, a
principle of strong pedigree at common law, and family privacy, the
value protected by the ban. Although Cory J. wrote the Court's opinion
invalidating the legislation, Wilson J. concurred separately to propose a
compromise between the majority's abstract analysis and the focus on.
context that she found attractive in La Forest J.'s dissent. She reconciled
the two in a "contextual approach,"51 which supported Cory J.'s result by
balancing values under section 1.
Madam Justice Wilson objected that Cory J. had "prejudge[d]
the issue" by "placing more weight on [expressive freedom] at large than
is appropriate in the context of the case."5 2 In other words, an abstract
conception of the right was too blunt an instrument for balancing values,
because its failure to preserve a role for the facts and circumstances of
particular cases weighted the equation in favour of the guarantee.
Noting that section 1 contemplated a balancing of interests, not
uncritical enforcement of the entitlement, Wilson J. suggested a
contextual approach, which would "bring into sharp relief' the aspect of
section 2(b) "truly at stake," as well as the relevant aspects of any values
in competition with it53 On the assumption that "a particular right or
48 A five member panel decided the case; a majority of three issued a "By the Court" opinion,
and McIntyre and Beetz JJ. dissented.
49 Supra note 12. A majority of four, Dickson, C.J., (Lamer, Cory, and Wilson ii. concurring)
invalidated the ban. L'Heureux-Dub6 and Sopinka JJ. joined La Forest J.'s dissenting opinion.
50 Supra note 9.
51 Edmonton Journal, supra note 12 at 1353.
5 2 Ibid. at 1353-54.
53 Ibid at 1355-56.
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freedom may have a different value depending on the context," her
principle would be conducive to "a fair and just compromise" under
section 1.54 Wilson J. predicted that the contextual approach would
produce a "generous interpretation aimed at fulfilling [the guarantee's]
purpose and securing for the individual the full benefit of the
guarantee."55
Although the Court had indicated in Oakes and other cases that
the section 1 analysis would vary with the circumstances, a term of art
was not coined until Edmonton Journal.5 6 Far more accessible and
intuitive than the abstract criteria of Irwin Toy and Oakes, the contextual
approach simply suggested that values be balanced under section 1.
Wilson J. offered a principle of interpretation which could ground Irwin
Toy's intangible concepts of meaning, purpose, and effect in the facts
and facilitate practical decisionmaking under section 1. In effect, she
integrated the rudiments of common law methodology-which is
situational and evidence-based-into the Charter's unfamiliar equation
of rights and limits. By doing so, she moved the constitutional analysis
away from the abstract terrain of Oakes and Irwin Toy, and onto the
more comfortable ground of common law decisionmaking. For all those
reasons, Edmonton Journal had tremendous intuitive appeal for courts
and judges experiencing difficulty with Oakes and the relationship
between the Charter's rights and reasonable limits under section 1.
Edmonton Journal's principle of interpretation also had
implications for section 2(b). Shifting the guarantee's values from
section 2(b) into section 1 was not a problem, because it was inevitable
both that the Charter would balance values and that the facts and
circumstances of expressive activity would matter under section 1. In the
aftermath of Irwin Toy, Wilson J. responded to the perception that the
Charter should not privilege the guarantee's "abstract" principles against
other values which were seen only in "context" under section 1. At the
same time, her response introduced a dichotomy between principle and
context, and in doing so suggested that distinctions between different
kinds of expressive activity could be drawn under section 1. As she
explained, expression may have greater value in a political context than in
Edmonton Journal's setting of a matrimonial dispute between private
parties. That comparison, in combination with the statement that "the
5 4 IbL
5 5 Ib at 1356.
5 6 See Oakes, supra note 19; and R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (both
indicating, in general terms, that the s. 1 test could vary with the circumstances).
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importance of the right or freedom must be assessed in context" under
section 1, placed Wilson J.'s approach potentially in conflict with Irwin
Toy's principle that the content or value of expressive activity is
irrelevant under the Charter.5 7 At that stage in the evolution of a
methodology, the conflict was latent. If Ford was correct that breach
and justification represent distinctive analytical concepts, the
inconsistency between section 2(b)'s definition of the right and section
l's approach to justification did not have to be resolved. Even so, in
attempting to bridge the divide between principle and context, Wilson
J.'s approach created an embryonic contradiction between Irwin Toy and
the emerging section 1 methodology.
That contradiction deepened in Rocket, which invalidated a
near-total prohibition on professional advertising by dentists.5 8
Although Irwin Toy's two-tiered approach to section 1 was directly on
point, McLachlin J. rejected that model of review in favour of Wilson
J.'s contextual approach. Thus, she suggested a "sensitive, case-oriented
approach" that would permit the courts to consider "the special features
of the expression in question." 5 9 Once again, Wilson J.'s proposal
offered a concrete alternative to the abstract structures and doctrines of
Irwin Toy and Oakes, and enabled judges to ground their conclusions in
the facts and evidence of particular cases. Rocket's contextualized
balancing of values weighed consumer choice and access to information
about dental services against competing interests in professionalism and
consumer protection. Ultimately, McLachlin J. held that the regulatory
scheme was unjustifiable and that the appropriate remedy, in the
circumstances, was to invalidate the legislation. 60
She vindicated the right of dentists to advertise but in doing so
set the Court's methodology in a certain direction. In unequivocal terms
McLachlin J. stated that "not all expression is equally worthy ofprotection.
Nor are all infringements equally serious."61 It followed that restrictions
on certain activities, such as advertising, might be easier to justify. Once
again, the difficulty is that both propositions undercut Irwin Toy's
inclusive and egalitarian conception of expressive freedom. Like Ford
5 7 Edmonton Journal, supra note 12 at 1356 [emphasis added].
58 Supra note 9. See the regulations under Ontario's Health Disciplines Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.
196, which made advertising by dentists, with few restricted exceptions, "professional misconduct":
R.R.O. 1980, Reg, 447, ss. 37(39), (41).
59 Rocket, supra note 9 at 246-47.
60 bid at 251-53 (concluding that judicial revision of the regulations would be inappropriate).
61 Ibid. at 247 [emphasis added].
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and Edmonton Journal, Rocket may also have assumed that different
principles apply to different sides of the equation. Even so, as a result of
Rocket the content or value of expressive activity, which Irwin Toy
deemed irrelevant under section 2(b), had become a key factor in the
section 1 analysis.
Still, it was not self-evident how Wilson J.'s principle of
interpretation could be incorporated into the Oakes test. In Keegstra, the
contextual approach provided a vehicle for grafting additional criteria
onto an analytical framework that was strict and abstract but too
entrenched to be easily changed or abandoned. In blunt terms, context
enabled the Court to introduce flexibility into a section 1 test that it
regarded as being too uncompromising. At this point, an important
difference between Irwin Toy and the contextual approach should be
noted. Under Irwin Toy, the standard of review depended on the
government's rationale and in particular, whether the state had acted as
the singular antagonist of the individual or in a capacity that advanced
the traditional values of democratic governance. While those
adjustments to Oakes retained section l's focus on the question of
justification, the contextual approach suggested, to the contrary, that the
value of the expressive activity should determine the stringency of
review. It is an important difference, and although their implications for
Oakes remained unclear, Edmonton Journal and Rocket had shifted some
of the attention under section 1 from the government and its burden of
justification to the entitlement and the value of the claim.
D. Step Three: Keegstra's Doctrine of Justification
The contextual approach was not assigned a concrete role in the
section 1 analysis until Chief Justice Dickson's majority opinion in
Keegstra.6 2 There, the Criminal Code's prohibition against hate
propaganda 63 raised two questions about Irwin Toy which, as yet, had
only been endorsed by three members of the Court. The first was
whether hate propaganda could be excluded from the Charter under the
judicially created exception to section 2(b) for violent forms of
62 Supra note 3. The chief justice's opinion was joined by Wilson, L'Heureux-Dub6, and
Gonthier JJ.; McLachlin J. dissented (La Forest and Sopinka JJ. concurring).
63 Section 319(2) of the Criminal Code provides as follows: "Every one who, by
communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any
identifiable group is guilty of ... (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction."
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expression. 64 Hence the dilemma of Keegstra: although any decision to
protect anti-Semitic teachings would ignore a strong instinct that
offensive expressive activity should not be covered by the Charter, Irwin
Toy had clearly stated that all expression is protected, no matter how
repugnant. Rather than concede the instinct to exclude invidious views
from the Charter, Dickson C.J. chose to honour Irwin Toy's promise that
section 2(b) protects all expression. Stating that it was "beside the
point"65 that hate propaganda is obnoxious, he held that "the content of
expression is irrelevant in determining the scope of [the guarantee]." 66
All members of the panel supported that interpretation of section 2(b).
Keegstra raised a second question about Irwin Toy and its two
levels of review under section 1.67 Irwin Toy diluted Oakes by reading a
reasonableness requirement into key parts of the test. In doing so, it
maintained that section 1's standard of justification could be relaxed in
cases that pose difficult questions about social and economic policies or
involve legislation that seeks to protect the vulnerable. However, where
the state acts as the singular antagonist of an accused, as in criminal
proceedings, Irwin Toy held that section I's requirements of justification
should be more scrupulously observed. Despite the Criminal Code
setting of Keegstra, which should have engaged Irwin Toy's singular
antagonist model of review, Dickson C.J.'s majority opinion relied on
McLachlin J.'s interpretation of the contextual approach in Rocket.
.The section 1 methodology that emerged is important for several
reasons. At the outset of the analysis, Dickson C.J. announced that it is
"dangerously misleading to conceive of s. 1 as a rigid and technical
provision," 68 and repeated the warning that a "rigid or formalistic
approach" must be avoided.69 Although the function of section 1 is
justification, he held that the Court should consider 'the right or freedom
at stake and the limit proposed by the state."70 Thus, a "proper judicial
perspective" on the synergetic relation between the values underlying
the Charter and the facts of a case could be attained by treating section 1
6 4 Keegstra, supra note 3 at 730-33 (stating that whiles. 2(b) protects all content of expression,
"certainly violence as a form of expression receives no such protection," citing Invin Toy, supra note
9 at 970).
65 Keegstra, supra note 3 at 730.
6 6 Ibd. at 732.
67 See text accompanying notes 39-41, supra.
68 Keegstra, supra note 3 at 735.
6 9 bIN at 737.
70Jbid [emphasis added].
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as a "gauge which is sensitive to the values and circumstances particular
to an appeal ... ."71 Through this link between the facts and values at
stake in particular cases and the contextual approach, the content of
expressive activity entered the section 1 analysis in Keegstra.
From there, the majority opinion's "gauging" of values
proceeded in a particular way. For reasons that are not explained, the
chief justice postponed his discussion of section 2(b)'s values to the
proportionality test. Meanwhile, under the first branch of Oakes, he
found that equality and multiculturalism are sufficiently important
objectives to justify limits on expressive freedom. Only after reaching
that conclusion did the chief justice turn to section 2(b). By then,
however, an asymmetric and hierarchical analysis had privileged sections
15 and 27 at the expense of expressive freedom.72 At that stage, Dickson
C.J. went on to consider section 2(b)'s values under the second branch of
Oakes, the "proportionality" test. There, Keegstra employed the
rationales which are intended to protect expressive freedom in order to
dilute the requirements of proportionality and thereby justify the limit.
On commencing that analysis, the chief justice conceded that he
had "commented at length upon the way in which the suppression of
hate propaganda furthers values basic to a free and democratic society,"
but said little about whether "these same values ... are furthered by
permitting hate propaganda."73 Once having made that observation, he
echoed Wilson J.'s concerns in Edmonton Journal about placing a
premium on abstract principle and stated that context was necessary
under section 1 to offset the "high value" section 2(b) places on
"freedom of expression in the abstract." 74 Contextualizing abstract
principle meant examining "the expression at stake in a particular case"75
to determine whether its content is at the "core" of section 2(b)'s values
or is only "tenuously connected" to them. 76 After creating a "core-
values" analysis, Dickson C.J. found that hate propaganda was of
"limited importance when measured against free expression values," 77
because it "contributes little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada"
and fails to promote the guarantee's values of truth-seeking, self-
71 Ibkd
72 Ibid at 755-58.
73 Ibid at 759-60 [emphasis in original].
74 Ibid at 760.
75 IbiL [emphasis in original].
76 Ibid at 761.
77 Ibid at 762.
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realization, or democratic debate.78 Citing Rocket, he concluded that
limits on expressive activity that "strays some distance from the spirit of
s. 2(b)" might be easier to justify.79
Although Dickson C.J. rejected a rigid and technical
interpretation of section 1, that explanation of his analysis in Keegstra is
unconvincing. Setting section 2(b)'s abstract values as the standard of
evaluation for particular expressive activity, and grafting that
comparison onto the minimal impairment branch of the proportionality
test hardly simplified the section 1 analysis. Instead, Keegstra's hierarchy
of values under the first branch of Oakes and its core-values gloss on the
proportionality test created a justificatory bias under section 1.
Ironically, Wilson J.'s principle of interpretation responded to the
asymmetry that might arise by placing section 2(b)'s values on a grand
and abstract scale, and then balancing them against competing interests
which were presented merely or exclusively "in context." Rather than
"balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context," her
approach placed the two sets of competing interests on equivalent or
similar grounds s0 To the extent that Irwin Toy may have privileged or
overvalued section 2(b), the contextual approach provided a corrective.
If the goal of Charter analysis is equilibrium between the right
and its limits, then Keegstra overcorrected the equation to uphold limits
on controversial expressive activity. After declaring that the Court
should reject the premium section 2(b) places on abstract principle, the
chief justice cited those very same principles to lower the standard of
review under section 1. In this way, a definition of freedom which
deemed the content of expression irrelevant under section 2(b)
supported the converse proposition under section 1, i.e., that valueless
expressive activity is entitled to little or no protection under the Charter.
That contradiction prompted McLachlin J. to declare, in dissent, that
"[ilf one starts from the premise that the speech covered by section
319(2) [of the Criminal Code] is dangerous and without value, then it is
simple to conclude that none of the commonly-offered justifications for
protecting freedom of expression are served by it."81
The majority opinion also collapsed the distinction between
value and harm. It is trite that valueless expressive activity is harmful in
some cases and innocuous in others. The distinction is fundamental,
78 Ibid. at 766.
79 Ibid
80 Edmonton Journal, supra note 12 at 1353-54.
81 Keegstra, supra note 3 at 841.
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though, because expression that is merely valueless is entitled to the
Charter's protection. The Court in Keegstra blurred that line by altering
the requirements of proportionality, including the government's burden
to demonstrate that its prohibition is rationally connected to the
prevention or punishment of a demonstrable harm.S2 In doing so, the
majority effectively assumed that expressive activity that is valueless
must also be harmful. Although hate propaganda unquestionably strays
from democratic values, value and harm are not synonymous. In the
absence of a demonstrable harm, relaxing the standard of
constitutionality to validate criminal sanctions against offensive
expression unquestionably violates Irwin Toy's principle of freedom.
Precisely because of its content, the Court's response to
expression that is offensive or controversial must be beyond reproach.
Although it is evident that Dickson C.J. wrestled with the issues in
Keegstra, his analysis compromised section 2(b). After endorsing Irwin
Toy's principle of freedom for all expression under section 2(b), he
engaged in an overt assessment of the value of particular expression
.under section 1. The gulf between an inclusive conception of the
guarantee and the proposition that section I review is determined by the
value accorded particular thoughts and ideas widened as a result.
Keegstra's justificatory bias was also reinforced by the chief justice's
decision to exclude section 2(b)'s values from the first branch of Oakes.
It is unfortunate that the Keegstra dissent has not been more
influential because several features of McLachlin J.'s opinion are
important. First, although she and the chief justice agreed that section
2(b) protects hate propaganda, they reached that conclusion by different
routes. Dickson C.J.'s interpretation of the guarantee rested on a
particular conception of the Charter's structure and its separation of the
rights and their limits. Citing Ford, he noted in Keegstra that "[i]t is the
presence of s. 1 which makes necessary [a] bifurcated approach to
Canadian freedom of expression cases" and also "permit[s] the Court to
give a large and liberal interpretation to s. 2(b)."83 In terms of hate
propaganda, he found that it is "[b]ecause Irwin Toy stresses that the
type of meaning conveyed is irrelevant" under section 2(b) that "[i]t is
enough that those who publicly and wilfully promote hatred convey or
attempt to convey a meaning ... ."84 Then, he held that "it must therefore
82 Ibid. at 767-71, Dickson C.J. (explaining how the government met the standard), and at 851-
54, McLachlin J. (dissenting).
83 Ibid. at 728.
84 Ibid. at 730.
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be concluded" that expressive activity which is invidious and obnoxious is
covered by section 2(b).85 The chief justice's interpretation of section
2(b) was based more on a view of the Charter's structure than on an
inclusive or egalitarian conception of expressive freedom.
Meanwhile, McLachlin J. confronted the distinction between
valuable and valueless expression under section 2(b) and in doing so,
advanced principled grounds for including hate propaganda in the
Charter. Not only did she acknowledge the difficulty of determining
which speech has redeeming value, she added that such "[a]ttempts to
confine [section 2(b)] only to content which is judged to possess
redeeming value or to accord with accepted values strike at the very
essence of the value of the freedom ...."86 For section 2(b) to be
meaningful, she concluded, it must protect expression which "challenges
even the very basic conceptions about our society."8 7 It followed that a
"true commitment" to freedom of expression "demands nothing less."88
Although she, unlike the chief justice, would have excluded threats of
violence from section 2(b), hate propaganda did not in her view fall
within that exception.8 9
It is not surprising that two such distinctive conceptions of
section 2(b) would be reflected in the section 1 analysis. The chief
justice viewed sections 2(b) and 1 as separate structural concepts and
therefore did not address the contradiction between his content-neutral
definition of the right and his content-based analysis of reasonable
limits. In dissent, McLachlin J. did attempt to integrate her conception
of the entitlement into the section 1 analysis. Under section 2(b), she
rejected the suggestion that equality and multiculturalism could take
precedence over expressive freedom. Although she agreed with Dickson
C.J. that section 319(2) of the Criminal Code satisfied the first branch of
the Oakes test, she did so on narrower grounds. Rather than choose
between values or indicate a preference for sections 15 and 27, she held
that it was permissible for Parliament to limit expressive activity which is
symptomatic of ongoing racial and religious prejudice.90
8 5 Ibid. [emphasis added]. The second step, requiring a purposeful infringement of s. 2(b)
before proceeding to s. 1, was easily met.
861bid. at 842 [emphasis added].
8 71bid.
8 8 Ibid [emphasis added].
8 9 Ibid at 829-32 (concluding that statements promoting hatred are not akin to violence or
threats of violence).
90Ibid. at 846-48.
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McLachlin J. also stressed the importance of focusing on the
question of justification under section 1. Any suggestion that the value
of particular expressive activity should determine the standard of review
deflects attention from section l's requirement that the government
demonstrate the reasonableness of its infringement. As a result, she
urged the Court not to be distracted from the question of justification by
the offensiveness of anti-Semitic views. In her view, once expression is
protected by the Charter, the focus under section 1 must be on the
justification of the limit and not on the content of the expression.
Unlike the chief justice, McLachlin J. emphasized the
importance of considering characteristics which relate "peculiarly to the
nature of freedom of expression" in section l's balancing of values. 91
Despite acknowledging that the suppression of hate propaganda
"undeniably muzzles the participation of a few individuals in the
democratic process," the chief justice concluded that "the degree of this
limitation is not substantial."92 By contrast, McLachlin J. warned at the
outset of her proportionality analysis, of the "dangers inherent in state
censorship" and of the need to give "particularly close consideration" to
restrictions which "touch the critical core of social and political
debate."93 She stated that it is particularly important to be aware of
those dangers under section 1, because the text of the Charter "expressly
requires the court to have regard to whether the limits are reasonable
and justified in a free and democratic society."94 She also indicated that
the "chilling effect"9s that a legal prohibition may have on legitimate
expressive activity must be taken into account under section 1.
After outlining those concerns, McLachlin J. considered section
319(2)'s implications for expressive freedom under each branch of the
proportionality test. In addressing the rational connection she expressed
skepticism that section 319(2) would curb hate-mongers and speculated
that, by conferring the "joy of martyrdom" on such individuals, it could
be counter-productive. 96 Her analysis of section 319(2)'s flaws under
minimal impairment is compelling, in large part because she scrutinized
the legislation from a critical perspective that required Parliament to
demonstrate that the infringement was minimal. She also gave the
91 Ibid at 849.
92 bi at 764.
93 Ibid. at 849.
94 Ib at 849-50 [emphasis in original].
95 Ibid. at 850.
96 Ibid. at 853.
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"significance of the impairment" serious consideration under the final
branch of the proportionality test. There, her conclusion that section
319(2) failed to satisfy that aspect of Oakes rested on the claim that the
Criminal Code "invokes all of the values upon which s. 2(b) ... rests" and
thereby affects the preservation of "democratic government and our
fundamental rights and freedoms." 97
Madam Justice McLachlin's dissenting opinion introduced
several principles that are vital to the protection of expressive freedom.
Under the first branch of Oakes, she declined to endorse any hierarchy
of values which would grant equality and multiculturalism paramountcy
over expressive freedom. In addition, she stressed the importance of
bringing the values underlying section 2(b)'s guarantee of freedom into
the section 1 analysis. Thus, she acknowledged that a "true
commitment" to section 2(b) requires breathing space for views that
challenge basic conceptions about our society. Realizing that the
commitment would be meaningless if they did not affect the section 1
analysis, she incorporated the guarantee's values into her discussion of
the proportionality test. Even so, McLachlin J. declined to challenge the
chief justice's methodology. In the circumstances, she may have felt
estopped from doing so by her own declaration in Rocket that not all
expression is equal and not all infringements are equally serious.98 Her
opinion in Keegstra nonetheless provided a foundation in principle for
protecting expressive freedom under section 1. She quite rightly
complained that the majority opinion failed to disentangle its distaste for
the expressive activity in question from the broader issues of principle
and methodology at stake. That simple but perceptive observation
pinpointed the flaws of a methodology that crystallized in Keegstra and
would soon be more firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence.
E. An Ambivalent Conception of Section 2(b)
Certain elements of the first generation of jurisprudence,
including the Supreme Court's decisions on access to government
property9 9 and the status of the press,100 have not been discussed in this
article. Just the same, it should be noted that there too, the Court's
9 7Ibid. at 863 [emphasis added].
9 8 Supra note 61.
9 9 Supra note 15.
1 0 0 Supra notes 12 and 14.
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responses confirmed its ambivalence towards section 2(b). On access,
for example, a seven-member panel agreed that an absolute prohibition
on the distribution of literature at a public airport could not be
justified.101 In reaching that conclusion, Commonwealth proposed three
different methodologies, each of which relied on Irwin Toy. As a matter
of principle, the threshold question in that case was whether access to
government property should be treated differently from other section
2(b) issues. While Lamer C.J. and McLachlin J. proposed criteria to
restrict the scope of access under the guarantee, L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
held that limits should be justified under section 1.102 Although no view
commanded a majority, the Court subsequently refused to choose
between Commonwealth's competing approaches when it decided
Ramsden.103 To this day, a framework of principle for addressing those
claims does not exist.
The status of the press also raised questions about the
importance of democratic values such as debate, access to information,
participation, and accountability. Uncertainty and confusion prevails
there as well. After receiving strong support in Edmonton Journal,
freedom of the press was unceremoniously dismissed in Lessard,104 New
Brunswick,lOS and Nova Scotia.106 More generally, although the Court's
rhetoric acknowledges the role that a free press plays in the democratic
process, it is reluctant to confer any "special status" under the Charter or
develop doctrines which recognize that role.10 7 Questions of principle
and methodology were once again avoided by a jurisprudence that
provided ad hoc answers to particular questions.
Meanwhile, in the years following Keegstra, Dickson CJ.'s
methodology became more entrenched. Its two main elements, a
101 Commonwealth, supra note 15.
1 0 2 See generally J. Cameron, "A Bumpy Landing: The Supreme Court of Canada and Access
to Public Airports Under Section 2(b) of the Charter" (1992) 2 M.C.L.R. 91; and R. Moon, "'Out of
Place': Comment on Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada" (1993) 38 McGill L.J.
204.
103 Supra note 15 (invalidating a municipal by-law that prohibited all postering on public
property).
1 0 4 Supra note 14.
105 Supra note 14.
10 6 Supra note 10.
107 See, for example, New Brunswick, supra note 14 at 475-80; Cory J. (stating, enigmatically,
that warrants against the press raise special concerns, without importing any new or additional
requirements for the issuance of search warrants). But see Carson, supra note 14 and text
accompanying notes 259-261, infra.
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hierarchy of values under the first branch of Oakes and a core-values
approach to proportionality, were solidified in Butler.lOS The result was
a sharper and more pronounced dilution of review under section 1.
There, in upholding the Criminal Code's definition of obscenity,109
Sopinka J. claimed that the objective was avoidance of harm, not moral
disapproval.110 His definition of harm was based on a conception of
obscenity and pornography as low value expressive activities that
undercut gender equality. He held, for example, that the first branch of
Oakes was satisfied because sexually explicit materials "seriously offend
the values fundamental to our society," such as "true equality between
male and female persons."Ill Like the chief justice in Keegstra, Sopinka
J. found that pornography could be limited under that part of the test
without balancing expressive freedom against gender equality.
Likewise, Butler's proportionality analysis both followed and
extended the example set by Keegstra. Sopinka J. began by stating that
the prohibition was easier to justify because "the kind of expression
which is sought to be advanced does not stand on equal footing with
other kinds of expression ... ,"112 That proposition led to a deferential
application of the proportionality test. Despite the absence of evidence
linking sexual expression with a concrete harm, he found a rational
connection because "it is reasonable to presume that exposure to images
bears a causal relationship to changes in attitudes and beliefs." 13 It was
sufficient, in his view, that Parliament had a reasonable basis for its
action or had responded to a "reasoned apprehension of harm."114
Under minimal impairment, Sopinka J. stated that the legislative scheme
need not be "perfect": as long as it was "appropriately tailored in the
context of the infringed right," it would satisfy the Charter.115 Finally, his
comments on the third proportionality test of Oakes left little doubt that
his constitutional analysis was grounded in disapproval of sexually
explicit expression. Given that "this kind of expression lies far from the
108 Supra note 4.
109 Section 163(8) of the Criminal Code states: "For the purposes of this Act, any publication a
dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of
the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene."
110 Butler, supra note 4 at 492.
1111bid at 496-97 [emphasis added].
112 Ibi. at 500.
113 Ibid. at 502.
114 biu at 504.
115 Ibid. at 504-05 [emphasis in original].
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core of the guarantee of freedom of expression," "appeals only to the
most base aspect of individual fulfilment" and is "primarily economically
motivated," he found that the objective of promoting equality among
members of society readily outweighed the interest in protecting
expressive freedom.16
Butler is important and surprising, in the first instance, because
Keegstra's methodology was effectively adopted by all members of the
Court. Unlike Keegstra, which was decided by a 4-3 vote, Butler failed to
provoke a dissent.117 Moreover, in adopting that approach, its core-
values contextual approach and reasoned apprehension of harm
standard further eroded the Oakes test. No member of the Court
considered the principles outlined in McLachlin J.'s Keegstra dissent
worth defending.1l8 Once again the Court failed to separate its
subjective perception of pornography from broader questions of
principle and methodology.
Although the methodology of Keegstra and Butler undercut
expressive freedom, its subsequent decision in Zundel revealed how
equivocal the Court can be on these issues. In that case, a majority
decision which could not easily be squared with Keegstra invalidated the
false news provision of the Criminal Code119 and reversed Ernst Zundel's
conviction for holocaust denial. Through a careful analysis that was
evidence- and context-based, McLachlin J. distinguished section 181's
false news prohibition from section 319(2)'s ban on hate propaganda120
and secured majority support for her opinion. She defended expressive
freedom in difficult circumstances a second time but did so without
questioning the methodology of Keegstra. Justices Cory and Iacobucci
116 Ibid. at 509.
11 7 Gonthier J. wrote separate concurring reasons at 511ff, which L'Heureux-Dub6 J. joined.
118 Ibid. at 504. Sopinka J., who had joined McLachlin J.'s dissent, mentioned Keegstra in
passing to suggest that a rational connection was established in Butler, but not Keegstra, because, in
contrast to the hate-monger who may gain an audience, the "prohibition of obscene materials does
nothing to promote the pornographer's cause."
119 Supra note 3, s. 181. The provision stated as follows: "Every one who wilfully publishes a
statement, tale or news that he knows is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief
to a public interest is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years."
I20 Supra note 63.
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wrote a passionate joint dissent that was based on the chief justice's
approach in Keegstra.1 21
The trilogy of Keegstra, Butler, and Zundel exemplifies the
confusion and uncertainty of the section 2(b) jurisprudence. On any
view of the results in particular cases, the Court's methodology lacked
principle and consistency. Although the relationship between sections
2(b) and 1 was resolved, in part, by bringing the guarantee's values into
section 1, their role in the analysis was distorted. Instead of forming part
of the conceptual framework for balancing values under section 1,
section 2(b)'s principles were restricted to the proportionality analysis.
Isolating expressive freedom in that part of the test meant that other
values, such as equality and multiculturalism, could be preferred under
the first branch of Oakes. Moreover, as part of the "context" of
proportionality under the second branch of Oakes, section 2(b)'s
principles played a significant but selective role. Instead of explaining
why the right should be protected, as might be expected, expressive
freedom's rationales enabled the Court to designate offensive activity as
"low value." Pursuant to that designation, the Court attenuated the
standard of review and diluted proportionality's requirements of harm,
rational connection, and minimal impairment.
The early cases set an unhealthy dynamic in motion, which had
its roots in Ford's assumption that the right and its limits are separate
concepts which call for two distinct analytical processes. That
assumption led to the following contradiction. Irwin Toy's principle of
freedom for all expressions of the heart and mind deemed the content or
value of expressive activity to be irrelevant under section 2(b). By the
time Butler was decided, however, the Court's section 1 methodology
espoused the opposite proposition: that the status of expressive activity
is contingent on its value and that thoughts or ideas which "stray some
distance" from section 2(b)'s core should receive little or no protection
under the Charter. That separation of concepts, the contradictions it has
spawned, and the resulting contortions of analysis are the hallmarks of
the first generation of jurisprudence. 122
As the next part demonstrates, the Supreme Court of Canada is
as ambivalent as ever toward expressive freedom. Despite the
121 Zundel, supra note 6 at 778ff. The Court split 4-3 again, with McLachlin J. writing for the
majority (La Forest, L'Heureux-Dub6, and Sopinka JJ. concurring), and Gonthier J. joining the
"joint dissent."
122 For a thoughtful discussion of the s. 2(b) jurisprudence, especially the relationship
between ss. 2(b) and 1, see R. Moon, "The Supreme Court of Canada on the Structure of Freedom
of Expression Adjudication" (1995) 45 U.T.L.J. 419.
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contradictions and the methodological bias in favour of justification,
section 2(b) prevailed in two of the three cases examined. Even so, they
show once again that it is the Court's methodology, not the results in
particular cases, that holds the key to section 2(b)'s future.
III. TEN YEARS LATER
A. Introduction
Almost a decade after Dolphin Delivery, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided three cases, each of which posed an untested question
about the scope of expressive freedom under the Charter. Two of the
three, Dagenais]23 and Scientology,124 considered whether common law
doctrine complies with section 2(b) of the Charter, and the third, RIR-
MacDonald, questioned the permissibility of strong legislative sanctions
against tobacco promotion.125 In its first decision on fair trial versus
expressive freedom, the Supreme Court in Dagenais recalibrated the
common law's equation to strengthen section 2(b)'s weight in the
balance. Due to the constraints of methodology, it was difficult for
Lamer C.J. to incorporate the guarantee's values into the section 1
analysis, and he was only partly successful in doing so.
Shortly after Dagenais, it was held in Scientology that section 2(b)
has not altered the common law of defamation. Given the jury's verdict
that the Church of Scientology acted maliciously, the plaintiff's claim to
damages need not have been jeopardized by a re-balancing of values
under the Charter. The Court applied a core-values analysis just the
same and entrenched the common law's preference for the protection of
reputation in the Charter jurisprudence. Finally, RJR-MacDonald
invalidated Parliament's tobacco control measures by the narrowest of
margins, against a strong dissent by La Forest J. That dissent proposed a
disturbing approach to section 1 which was followed in Ross.126 This
part of the article analyzes the Supreme Court of Canada's commitment
to expressive freedom in these cases and concludes with a brief review of
the status of section 2(b) today.
123 Supra note 12.
124 Supra note 6.
12 5 Supra note 9.
12 6 Supra note 8.
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B. Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.: Accommodating Values
Dagenais invalidated a controversial publication ban and
modified common law doctrine to comply with the Charter. In doing so,
the Supreme Court of Canada legitimized third-party status in criminal
proceedings and constitutionalized the common law of publication
bans.127 The question under section 2(b) was whether a broadcast of
The Boys of St. Vincent, a fictional drama, would prejudice the fair trials
of several accused who, as members of a religious order, were charged
with committing acts of sexual assault in circumstances strongly
resembling those of the "drama." The criminal charges and proposed
broadcast arose against a backdrop of heightened public awareness and
concern about abuses of authority, including physical and sexual assault,
which occurred many years ago at various training and educational
institutions around the country. Not only did The Boys of St. Vincent
portray the institutions and individual priests who committed such acts
unsympathetically, the pre-broadcast advertising claimed a direct
parallel between the fictional program and the unsettling revelations and
prosecutions of recent years.1 28
Paradoxically, the decision in Dagenais was both easy and
difficult. On the one hand, the publication ban was "far too broad," and
despite the parallel, the threat to a fair trial arose from a fictional
program and fictional characters, not pre-trial publicity about the
individuals being tried.129 On the other-hand, it was unclear why third
parties such as the CBC should have access to an appeal in criminal
proceedings between the Crown and the accused 3 O Moreover, the
lower court jurisprudence was virtually unanimous that the Charter had
127 Supra note 12. Lamer C.J. wrote the majority opinion on both issues (Sopinka, Cory,
Iacobucci and Major JJ. concurring); McLachlin J. wrote concurring reasons; Gonthier J. concurred
on the third party issue but dissented under s. 2(b); La Forest J. concurred on s. 2(b) and dissented
on the third party issue; and L'Heureux-Dub6 J. dissented both on the third party and the s. 2(b)
question.
128 (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 239 at 242-43 (C.A.).
129 Dagenais, supra note 12 at 881. Not only did the trial judge impose a national ban to
protect fair trial interests at stake in Ontario, she banned the publication of any information about
the broadcast schedule or the application for the order; the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the
ban but restricted it to the geographic location of the trials and reversed the bans on publication of
the broadcast schedule and court proceedings.
130 Third party issues are not discussed in this paper. See generally J. Cameron, "Tradition
and Change Under the Charter. The Adversary System, Third Party Interests and the Legitimacy of
Criminal Justice in Canada" in J. Cameron, ed., The Charter's Impact on the Criminal Justice System
(Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 217.
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not altered the common law and its preference for fair trial values.1 31 In
such circumstances, the Ontario Court of Appeal's conclusion that those
interests ought to prevail over any "inconvenience" the CBC might suffer
in rescheduling its program was predictable.13 2 To many, it was far from
apparent that the Charter had changed the common law's balancing of
values.
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision to accept jurisdiction,
invalidate the order, and modify the common law represented a major
victory for third-party and section 2(b) rights, which provoked dissents
on both issues. As to section 2(b), Gonthier J. Objected in dissent that
the Charter does not require the Court to depart from the common law
"in any substantive respect" and rejected the suggestion that "we
emulate American society" or otherwise "discard the unique balancing
of fundamental values" that existed prior to 1982.133 In his view, the
Charter should have minimal impact in areas such as publication bans,
where the common law reinforces, rather than derogates from,
fundamental values. L'Heureux-Dub6'J. agreed that the Charter does
not render the common law invalid, especially where its balancing of
values is "an expression of the very rights protected by the Charter."134
In all the circumstances, including the lower court jurisprudence,
the appellate decision and the dissenting opinions, the majority opinion
in Dagenais was obliged to explain why the common law's balancing of
values was inappropriate under the Charter. Chief Justice Lamer's
reading of the constitutional text, which treats expressive freedom and a
fair trial as equivalent values, led him to conclude that the common law
rule which "automatically favoured" fair trial should be reformulated 35
In doing so, he added that a hierarchical approach to rights must be
avoided "both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the
common law."136 Dagenais ameliorated that common law hierarchy by
grafting elements of the section 1 analysis onto the pre-Charter doctrine.
131 See, for example, Re Southam Inc. and the Queen (No. 2) (1985), 141 D.L.R. (3d) 349 at
354 (Ont. H.C.J.), Smith J. (declaring that "[i]t could not have been in the contemplation of the new
Fathers of Confederation that the rights of an accused person should be whittled down in the name
of a general concept of [freedom of expression].")
13 2 Dagenais, supra note 12 at 855.
133 Ib. at 928-29.
134 Ibid. at 916.
135 Ibid. at 877-78.
136 Ibid. at 877.
19971
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
For example, the chief justice specified that a publication ban
can only be granted when it is necessary to permit a real and substantial
risk to the fairness of a trial.137 He warned that bans are not available to
prevent "remote and speculative dangers" and affirmed the Court's faith
in the jury's ability to ignore extraneous considerations and follow the
judge's instructions.1 38 At the same time, he endorsed the common law's
threshold test of a real and substantial risk, and found that requirement
satisfied in Dagenais because the ban was "clearly directed" towards the
prevention of that risk.139 Under the view that a risk of prejudice, not
prejudice in fact, is sufficient, the chief justice's modified rule would
permit a ban aimed at "the diminution of the risk that the trial ... might
be rendered unfair." 140 A low threshold of risk enabled him to
accommodate both values through the requirement that alternative
measures be employed in such cases, but only where "reasonably
available." Despite restricting access to bans, Lamer C.J.'s doctrine
would prohibit publication where the prejudice is either unknown or
indeterminate but measures such as sequestration of the jury are
considered unreasonable. In principle, however, questions of
accommodation and alternative measures should not arise until it is
demonstrated, by some measure of certainty, that the fairness of the trial
truly is at risk. By setting a higher standard of prejudice under the
rational connection test, McLachlin J.'s concurring opinion proposed a
stronger safeguard against "the facile assumption that if there is any risk
of prejudice to a fair trial, ... the ban should be ordered." 141
The chief justice's requirement that reasonably available
alternative measures be adopted to accommodate both constitutional
values is nonetheless highly innovative. In the circumstances of The Boys
of St. Vincent, such measures were available and it was unnecessary for
him to expand on that concept. He also proposed a modification to the
final branch of the proportionality analysis, which would test a ban's
deleterious effects on section 2(b) against its salutary benefits for the
fairness of the trial and the integrity of the criminal justice system. 142
13 7Ibid. at 878 [emphasis in original].
138 IbiL at 880 and 885.
139 IbM. at 880.
140 Ibid. at 879 [emphasis added].
141 Ibid at 950 (stating that it is necessary to show that many eligible jurors would see the
broadcast, that the broadcast might confuse or predispose potential jurors, and that the confusion
may not be dispelled by other measures).
142 Ibid at 878 and 887-88.
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Dagenais unquestionably adjusted common law doctrine in
favour of expressive freedom. The chief justice's opinion achieved that
result, in part, by conceding that the Charter cannot take "all conceivable
steps" to remove "even the most speculative risks," and acknowledging
that a ban which "trenches" on expressive freedom must be carefully
reviewed.143 By grafting a modified concept of proportionality onto
common law doctrine, he set a higher threshold for bans which
compromise the openness and accountability of the justice system. It is
also significant that Lamer C.J. demonstrated how the Oakes test can be
adapted to accommodate pre-Charter contexts and doctrines. In doing
so, Dagenais integrated the basic elements of Oakes into common law
doctrine without compromising the integrity of either.
Even so, Dagenais was lacking in its commitment to section 2(b)
values. To declare, for example, that sections 2(b) and 11(d) have equal
status is simply to make an observation about the text. In addition, that
observation created an unresolved tension with Keegstra and Butler,
where section 2(b)'s equal status did not prevent it from being
subordinated to section 15 under the first branch of Oakes. More
importantly, although Dagenais rejected a hierarchical approach to
rights, it failed to explain how the competing values should be balanced
under the Court's modified rule. In discussing that issue, the chief
justice supplied a list of reasons "for and against bans," 144 both to
contextualize the issues and discredit the conflictual assumptions of the
"clash model," and then declared that those factors were "simply
intended to illustrate the breadth of issues that deserve a place but are
not often found in the analysis of ... particular publication bans."145
That comment was perceptive: with the exception of McLachlin J.'s
Keegstra dissent, the values which support the protection of expressive
freedom-rather than its dilution-are not found in the section 1
analysis.
As noted above, the Court's modified rule would preclude bans
when reasonably available measures could prevent the risk to a fair trial.
Unfortunately, the chief justice failed to elaborate what reasonableness
means or to explain how alternatives which impose a burden on the trial
process, like jury sequestration, should be weighed. As Gonthier J.'s
comments demonstrate, however, the interests at stake cannot fairly be
balanced unless section 2(b)'s principles are factored into the Court's
143 Ibid. at 880.
144 Ibid. at 882-83.
145 Ibid. at 883.
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conception of what "reasonably available" requires. In dissent, he
claimed that any restriction on expressive freedom that flowed from the
ban on The Boys of St. Vincent would -be "minor."146 While his
conclusion was specific to docudramas, to dismiss a ban as a minor
restriction in any circumstances, but especially amidst the debate of
recent years, shows how little weight section 2(b) carried in his
accommodation of values.1 47 It is disappointing that Lamer C.J. failed
to respond or otherwise indicate any disagreement with Gonthier J.'s
interpretation of his rule. In leaving those remarks unanswered, the
majority opinion missed an important opportunity to substitute a
foundation of principle for ad hoc perceptions of what reasonableness
requires under section 1.
Finally, the chief justice's gloss on the final branch of the
proportionality test should be noted. There, he proposed a
salutary-deleterious effects comparison, which would weigh the harmful
consequences of compromising section 2(b) against the benefits gained
by preserving a fair trial. Specifically, he stated that "when a ban has a
serious deleterious effect on freedom of expression and has few salutary
effects on the fairness of a trial, the ban will not be authorized at
common law."148 That gloss acknowledges that constitutional violations
are per se harmful and requires that harm to be weighed in determining
the justifiability of the infringement. Like his earlier observation about
issues that deserve a place in the analysis, the chief justice's comments
about the final stage of the proportionality test underscore the poverty
of the Court's methodology: it is the only part of the Oakes test that
explicitly incorporates the cost of the infringement into the analysis. As
such, it contemplates the prospect that an infringement which is
otherwise justifiable might fail because the violation is more harmful
than beneficial. Yet, as experience has shown, limits which satisfy all
other parts of the test are unlikely to falter at that stage of the
analysis.1 49 Chief Justice Lamer's attempt to bolster that requirement
highlights how badly the section 1 test is skewed. Section 2(b)'s
underlying values should be at the forefront of the analysis and not an
146 Ibid. at 929.
14 7Ibid. at 929-31.
148 Ibid. at 889.
149 Zundel, supra note 6 held that s. 181 of the Criminal Code failed final proportionality after
it had already been struck under other parts of the test. See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, 4th student ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 699-700 [hereinafter Hogg student ed.] (stating
that "this step has never had any influence on the outcome of any case.")
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afterthought which only enters the equation after the justifiability of the
limit has been established. 150
The chief justice's majority opinion ameliorated the balance
between fair trial and expressive freedom, but was constrained in doing
so by the biases of the common law and the Court's methodology. By
endorsing the common law's standard of risk, Lamer C.J. failed to make
it clear that a sufficient threat must be established before expressive
freedom can be limited to protect fair trial interests. Under
proportionality he rejected the clash model but failed to indicate how
the values at stake should influence the accommodation of interests.
Not doing so places expressive freedom at risk of being outweighed by a
vague and unfettered conception of what alternative measures are
reasonable. Dagenais was a limited victory because expressive freedom
prevailed but did so without incorporating fully section 2(b)'s underlying
values into the section 1 analysis.
C. Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto: The Clash Model
Only a few months after Dagenais rejected a hierarchy that
preferred fair trial over expressive freedom, Scientology pitted section
2(b) against the law of defamation. There, the Court adopted a different
approach to the resolution of conflicting values at common law. Unlike
Dagenais, which sought an accommodation of interests, Scientology
embraced the clash model and its hierarchy of values. Speaking for the
Court, Cory J. applied the Keegstra methodology and reputation, which
is a non-Charter value, emerged paramount over expressive freedom,
which is explicitly guaranteed by section 2(b).151
The defamation action had its genesis in proceedings involving a
Crown attorney who had prosecuted criminal charges against the Church
of Scientology. The prosecutor, Mr. Hill, was the subject of a
courthouse-steps press conference at which the Church and its lawyer
wrongfully accused him of contempt, charging the prosecutor with
violating a judicial sealing order that had been part of the earlier
15 0 See Part IV(A), below.
151 Scientology, supra note 6. Lamer C.J., who wrote the majority opinion in Dagenais,supra
note 12, and Sopinka J., who joined that opinion, did not participate in Scientology. In fact, at a
much earlier phase of the litigation, John Sopinka (as he then was) argued as counsel for one of the
defendants to the libel action that Canadian courts ought to adopt the American Sullivan doctrine:
see Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto (1985), 35 C.C.L.T. 72 (Ont. H.C.J.). L'Heureux-Dub6
J. concurred separately to add certain comments about "Charter values" and to dissent from Cory
J.'s view of qualified privilege.
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proceedings. That accusation prompted a civil action by the Crown
officer, and an award of $1.6 million in damages against the Church of
Scientology and its counsel.152 The case reached the Supreme Court of
Canada on the Charter question whether common law principles of libel
and slander are modified by section 2(b)'s guarantee of expressive
freedom.
Like Dagenais, Scientology was also an easy and a difficult case.
From one perspective, it presented a difficult challenge. Ten years after
Dolphin Delivery, the Charter's impact on the law of defamation
remained unclear. In the meantime, the lower court jurisprudence had
uniformly resisted the pressure to adopt the American Sullivan rule,
which confers constitutional protection, absent malice,153 on false and
defamatory statements about public officers.154 While Sullivan was a
"press case"155 and Scientology was not, the plaintiff was a public officer
and that should have been enough to implicate the First Amendment
jurisprudence and its status under the Charter. Still, the case could have
been easy because unreviewable jury verdicts against both defendants
virtually guaranteed that the claim would survive any
constitutionalization of the common law imaginable.15 6 Although the
constitutional issue did not place the plaintiff's entitlement at risk, the
Court held conclusively against section 2(b) on all points but one.
Cory J.'s opinion began by considering whether the Charter
applies to a civil suit between a Crown officer and a non-governmental
actor. Unlike Dolphin Delivery, which concerned a dispute between two
purely private parties, Scientology involved aprosecutor's civil action
against criminal defendants who had accused him of misconduct as an
officer of the Crown.15 7 In such circumstances, any suggestion that the
15 2 The complicated facts are set out in Scientology, supra note 6 at 1141-58.
153 Sullivan, supra note 28 at 280 (equating malice "with knowledge that [a statement] was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
154 Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.); Derrickson v.
Tomat (1992), 63 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (C.A.) [hereinafter Derrickson]; and Coates v. The Citizen
(1988), 85 N.S.R (2d) 146 (S.C.T.D.) all rejected the Sullivan rule, supra note 28, under s. 2(b) of
the Charter.
155 Supra note 28 at 257. The case involved a Montgomery Alabama police commissioner who
sued The New York Times for publishing an advocacy advertisement by civil rights workers that
accused "Southern violators" and "police" of harassing civil rights protesters during the early 1960s
with trumped-up criminal charges. Neither the plaintiff nor anyone else was named directly.
15 6 See text accompanying note 199, infra.
157 In Dolphin Delivery, supra note 2, the dispute arose in contract and tort between a private
labour union and a private corporation that was the proposed target of secondary picketing.
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plaintiff had either been defamed or had sued in his capacity as a private
citizen was problematic. To the contrary, the lawsuit arose from
proceedings and a judicial sealing order that were directly under his
authority as Crown prosecutor. Moreover, the government's generosity
in financing Mr. Hill's action hinted that there might be more at stake
than a private contest between private parties.158 Although the purpose
of the lawsuit was to vindicate the Crown attorney's reputation, Cory J.
held that section 32's requirement of government action was not
satisfied.
He reacted strongly to the suggestion that a different regime
might apply to public officers. Because reputation "exists for everyone
quite apart from employment," "identical" defamatory comments could
not be subject to "two different laws," one for governmental officers and
another for private citizens.15 9 To avoid that dichotomy, Cory . found
that the plaintiff's libel action was "independent of and distinct from [the
Crown officer's] status as an agent for the government."16 0 Although the
events that had prompted the contempt action were directly related to
his responsibilities as a prosecutor,16 1 the plaintiffs lawsuit was deemed
to fall outside the scope of his duties as a Crown attorney and was not
subject to the Charter.
The Court's section 32 analysis reveals a limited understanding
of the relationship between the Charter's constraints on government and
section 2(b)'s underlying values. The test is not whether the civil action
fell within the statutory definition of a Crown officer's powers, but
whether his legal action infringed the defendants' rights under the
Charter. On that question, it is difficult to understand how the plaintiffs
status as a public officer and conduct as a Crown prosecutor could be
detached from his reputation as a lawyer. Precisely because
constitutional rights are meant to protect citizens from the government
and its agents, the law draws distinctions between governmental and
non-governmental actors. Sections 7 and 8 to 14 of the Charter impose
duties on Crown attorneys and fetter their discretion in the criminal
justice system; there should be no doubt that the same officers are
158 The attorney general had a particular interest in vindicating the integrity of an individual
who was responsible for a controversial and well-publicized investigation, and a more general
interest in discouraging criticisms of the office.
159 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1161.
160 Ibid. at 1162.
161 Under Ontario's Crown Attorney's Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.49, ss. 10, 11, prosecutors such as
Mr. Hill are described as "agent[s] for the Attorney General" who exercise powers to "aid in the
administration of justice."
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likewise bound not to violate section 2(b)'s guarantee of expressive
freedom.16 2 In rejecting that logic, the Court in Scientology Freated a
libel exception to the rule that the Charter binds governments and their
employees.
Once having found that section 32 was not engaged, Cory J.
considered whether the law of defamation should be modified under
Dolphin Delivery's direction that the common law develop "in a manner
consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution."163
Stressing the distinction between Charter rights and Charter values, Cory
J. emphasized that "[c]are must be taken not to expand the application
of the Charter beyond that established by s. 32(1)."164 After noting that
courts have been cautious in amending the common law, he stated that
the courts "must not go further than is necessary when taking Charter
values into account." 165 Against the weight of decisions including
Dagenais, BCGEU v. British Columbia (A. G.) ,16 R v. Salituro,16 7 and R. v.
Swain,168 Cory J. insisted in Scientology that "[f]ar-reaching changes to
the common law must be left to the legislature."169
Whether under section 32 or section 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, the law of defamation violates expressive freedom and a
section 1 analysis is necessary. There, Scientology's response confirmed
the depth of the Court's resistance to the claim in this case. Stating that
a "traditional s. 1 framework is not appropriate," Cory J. held that the
balancing must be "more flexible" when section 32 is not engaged
because values, not rights, are at stake. 170 More specifically, flexibility
meant that the party claiming the Charter's benefit must establish both
that the common law is inconsistent with constitutional values and that it
162 One of the best examples is R. v. Stinchcombe, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 754 (imposing a wide duty
of disclosure on Crown officers under s. 7 of the Charter).
163 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1165 [emphasis in original].
164 Ibid. at 1170 [emphasis added].
165 Ibid. at 1171.
166 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (holding that court orders can be subject to Charter review and that the
picketing of courts is protected under s. 2(b) but may be proscribed under s. 1).
167 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 654 (altering a common law rule about spousal testimonial incompetency
in criminal trials, based on "Chartervalues").
168 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (invalidating a common law procedure that permitted the Crown to
raise the issue of an accused's insanity, even over the accused's objection).
169 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1171.
170 Ibid.
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is unjustifiable. In other words, Scientology declared the common law
presumptively justifiable despite the infringement of section 2(b).
Only a few months earlier, Dagenais had addressed a similar
question about the constitutional status of common law doctrine. On its
face, the common law's inconsistency with Charter values was more
glaring in Scientology because reputation is not the textual equivalent of
expressive freedom and can only be "read in" to the Charter by
inference.171 Cory J. dodged the chief justice's admonition in Dagenais
against a hierarchy of rights by undertaking a core-values analysis.
Citing Keegstra and Butler, he declared that defamatory statements are
"very tenuously related to the core values which underlie s. 2(b)"
because such statements are inimical to the truth, cannot enhance self-
development; and will not lead to "healthy" participation in the affairs of
the community.1 72 In reaching that conclusion, he neglected to consider
or mention the Court's decision in Zundel, which explained why the
distinction between truth and falsehood can be a dangerous basis for
limiting expressive freedom.173 Instead, Cory J. invoked Globe & Mail
Ltd. v. Boland,174 decided long before the Charter, and its declaration
that defamatory statements about election candidates would be "harmful
to that 'common convenience and welfare of society,"' because "sensitive
and honourable men" would otherwise be deterred from seeking
positions of trust and responsibility.175 In light of the conclusion that the
plaintiffs lawsuit was purely personal, the Court's solicitude for the
sensibilities of public officers is puzzling.
On the other side of the ledger Cory J. held, despite the lack of
textual equivalence, that reputation implicates democratic values and is
entitled to "just as much" protection as freedom of expression.376
Unlike the Church of Scientology's criticism of a Crown officer, which
he characterized as being tenuously related to section 2(b)'s values, the
good reputation of individuals is fundamentally important to our
"democratic society."177 He noted that defamation law is "the product of
171 Although he recognized that "it is not specifically mentioned," Cory J. found that "the
good reputation of the individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a
concept which underlies all the Charter rights": ibid. at 1179.
172 Ibid. at 1174.
173 Supra note 6 at 753-59, McLachlin J.
174 [1960] S.C.R. 203 at 208.
175 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1174.
1 76 1bid. at 1175.
1771bid. at 1179 [emphasis added].
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its historical development up to the 17th century," and though "subject
to a few refinements," remains "of vital importance" today.178 Without
acknowledging that the Charter, like the emergence of defences such as
qualified privilege and fair comment, might be regarded as one such
refinement, Cory J. held that "the law of defamation is [not] unduly
restricting or inhibiting."179
Scientology's failure to provide any section 1 analysis is unique in
the section 2(b) jurisprudence. Although civil liability for defamatory
statements unquestionably infringes expressive freedom, so paramount
was the protection of reputation that Cory J. did not consider the
question of justification. Hence the contrast: unlike Dagenais, where the
Court grafted elements of the proportionality test onto common law
doctrine to protect equivalent Charter values, Scientology conceded the
paramountcy of reputation, a nontextual value, and eliminated the
section 1 test. In a jurisprudence that is self-conscious about the
Charter's structure and section l's mandate to balance values, the
decision to ignore the justification side of the equation is baffling. Yet,
as Cory J. explained, "[s]urely it is not requiring too much of individuals
that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they publish," because
those who publish statements should "assume a reasonable level of
responsibility."18 0 Yet the common law's conception of responsibility
imposes strict liability and limits the defences available to those who
cannot prove the truth of their statements.
Alhough the Charter did not apply and the Court held that
"there is no need to amend or alter" the common law, three issues
remained.181 First was the status of the Sullivan rule, which extended
constitutional protection to defamatory statements about public officers
that are made without malice.182 In 1964, at the threshold of a First
Amendment renaissance, Sullivan was proclaimed as perhaps "the best
and most important [decision] ... ever produced in the realm of freedom
178 Ibid. at 1177-78.
179 1bd at 1187.
180 Ibid.
18 1 Ibid. at 1188.
182 The significance of Sullivan is discussed in "First Amendment and Section 1," supra note
28 at 95-100.
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of speech."183 Despite recurring doubts about its viability as doctrine,184
Sullivan could have influenced section 2(b), if not by providing a
ready-made rule of constitutional law, then at least by offering a
rationale for granting expressive freedom some protection under the
Charter. However, the Court in Scientology dismissed Sullivan's rule
without considering whether its rationale could enrich the Charter's
conception of expressive freedom. As Sullivan explained, however,
debate which is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public
officials.185 Whatever its flaws as doctrine may be, the enduring lesson
of Sullivan is that free discussion of public issues is intimately connected
with principles of accountability and responsible government. Having
earlier concluded that defamatory statements are only tenuously related
to section 2(b)'s values, the Court discounted Sullivan as a social and
political artifact, an exceptional response to "dramatic facts."18 6
While the Court is right to be skeptical of American doctrine,
Sullivan was not put forward as an all or nothing proposition.187
Although Scientology gave the Court a valuable opportunity to
harmonize the common law and section 2(b) of the Charter, Cory J.
foreclosed any possibility of a compromise between the Charter's
guarantee of expressive freedom and the law of defamation. His refusal
to acknowledge the link between expressive freedom and democratic
accountability in this case is particularly surprising.188
Second, Cory J. reviewed the defence of qualified privilege. At
common law the privilege applied only to reports on proceedings and
183 H. Kalven Jr., "The New York Times Case: A Note on 'the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment' [1964] Sup. Ct. Rev. 191 at 194.
184 See, for example, R.A. Epstein, "Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong? (1986) 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 782.
185 Sullivan, supra note 28 at 270.
186 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1182.
187 The Court could have modified common law doctrine any number of ways without
adopting the actual malice test: see, for example, Factum of the Appellant, Church of Scientology of
Toronto, Supreme Court of Canada, Court File No. 24216, paras. 60-77 [unpublished] (reviewing
models for reform in English, Australian, and American jurisdictions); Factum of the Appellant,
Morris Manning, Supreme Court of Canada, Court File No. 24216, paras. 29-42 [unpublished]
(proposing a Canadian constitutional rule based on qualified privilege); and Factum of the
Intervenor, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Supreme Court of Canada, Court File No. 24216,
paras. 27-34 [unpublished] (proposing a reasonable belief standard).
188 Previously, Cory J. had acknowledged that link in Edmonton Journal, supra note 12 at
1336; in his dissenting opinions in Vickery,supra note 12 at 709; in New Bmnswick, supra note 14 at
475; and in R. v. Kopyto (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 449 at 462-63 (C.A.), Cory J.A. (as he then was).
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
documents which were either filed with the court or on record in open
court. The question in Scientology was whether the defendants' press
conference was privileged, although the contempt action had not been
filed and was not a court document at the time. Because the failure to
comply with that requirement was the result of misadventure, Cory J.
held that the defence could not be defeated "by the kind of technicality
which arose in this case."18 9 After expanding the privilege in that
direction, he promptly narrowed its scope in another. Although
qualified privilege is subject at common law to malice and the jury found
that the Church's lawyer had not acted with malice, he withheld the
defence because the lawyer failed to take reasonable steps to confirm
the allegations of contempt.190 In doing so, Scientology appears to
import a negligence standard into a defence that was previously based
on actual or express malice, knowing or reckless disregard, or
dishonesty. 91 At present, it remains unclear whether this aspect of
Scientology should be considered fact- and evidence-based or read,
instead, as a modification that redefines the defence of qualified
privilege.192
Finally, the defendants and intervenors sought review of the
jury's award for damages, which totalled $1.6 million. Under general
principles of tort law the question was whether the damages were
reasonable, and whether awards for defamation, like personal injury,
should be capped.1 93 In addition, counsel raised questions about the
constitutionality of punitive or non-compensatory damages, the
proportionality of the awards, the burden they impose on expressive
freedom, and the availability of less intrusive alternatives.194 After
stating that its assessment should not be varied on appeal "unless it
189 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1192.
190 Ibid. at 1193 (explaining that the lawyer was duty-bound to take reasonable steps before
making such serious allegations).
191 Ibi at 1189.
192 See M. Doody, "New Common Law Libel Privilege to Report on Court Documents: Hill v.
Church of Scientology of Toronto" (1996), 18 Advocates' Q. 251 at 256 (suggesting that Scientology
might be limited by its unique facts).
193 The Supreme Court of Canada imposed a "rough upper limit" of $100,000 in 1978 dollars
for non-pecuniary damages in the personal injury "trilogy" ofAndrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd.,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 229; Thornton v. Board of School Trustees of School District No. 57 (Prince George),
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 267; andArnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287.
194 See supra note 187; see also Factum of the Intervenor, Media Coalition, Supreme Court of
Canada, Court File No. 24216 [unpublished]; and Factum of the Intervenor, the Writers' Union of
Canada, PEN Canada, Canadian Association of Journalists, Periodical Writers Association of Canada
and Book and Periodical Council, Supreme Court of Canada, Court File No. 24216 [unpublished].
[VOL. 35 NO. I
Expressive Freedom Under the Charter
shocks the conscience of the court," Cory J. upheld the jury's
unprecedented award of general, aggravated, and punitive damages.195
Despite limits on damages in personal injury cases, he refused to
impose a similar cap in Scientology because defamation is "entirely
different."196 The most important distinction between the two is that
libel damages infringe and burden a constitutionally protected right.
Without mentioning the Charter arguments raised by counsel, Cory J.
rejected the cap because it would "change the whole character and
function of the law of defamation."19 7 By making it more compatible
with section 2(b), limits on the size and availability of such damages
would unquestionably change the law of defamation. In Derrickson, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal recognized that "we can no longer
apply common law rules relating to damages for defamation which
belong to an earlier and very different era."198 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court of Canada's analysis in Scientology was too one-sided to
acknowledge that damages burden constitutional values.
Scientology is a regrettable landmark in the section 2(b)
jurisprudence. Although the decision could have upheld the plaintiff's
claim and modified the common law, the Court chose instead to issue
definitive pronouncements about the paramountcy of reputation.199 In
doing so, Cory J. expressed unmistakable resistance to section 2(b) at
virtually every stage of the analysis: in rejecting the claim under section
32, applying the Charter's values under section 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, balancing expressive freedom and reputation, failing to
provide any section 1 analysis, dismissing Sullivan, restricting the defence
of qualified privilege, and ratifying unprecedented damages. Instead of
accommodating the values at stake, the Court applied a clash model and
reputation, a non-Charter value, prevailed over section 2(b)'s explicit
guarantee of expressive freedom. Cory J. added a single qualification,
195 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1195-96. As a matter of tort law, the focus in making such
awards should be on compensating the plaintiff for damage to his or her reputation and, in rare
cases, on the need for additional sanctions against outrageous conduct. Even under a traditional
conception of damages Cory J.'s sympathy for the plaintiff and solicitude for his feelings was
disproportionate: ibiL at 1200-03.
196 Ibid. at 1197.
197Ibid. at 1198.
198 Supra note 154 at 297.
199 While the jury's verdict against the Church could have easily withstood the Sullivan
standard, it found that the lawyer, Morris Manning, had not acted with malice at common law;
whether his conduct displayed reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the allegation is
therefore less certain. Other options were also put before the Court: see supra note 187.
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that "this appeal does not involve the media or political commentary
about government policies."200 That qualification could enable the
Court to "read down" Scientology in the future and restrict it to its
distinctive elements-an "unreviewable" jury verdict which awarded
"reasonable" damages in a contest between two "purely private" parties.
Of greater concern are Scientology's broader implications for
section 2(b). So visceral was the Court's reaction to the merits that it
only saw one side of the equation. To some extent, Scientology is
reminiscent of the dissenting opinions in Dagenais, which effectively
argued that it would be impossible for the common law to be
unconstitutional because the pre-Charter balancing "was an expression
of the very rights protected by the Charter."201 Following the majority
opinion's warning against a hierarchy of rights in Dagenais, however, it is
difficult to understand how reputation could attain such uncritical
paramountcy over expressive freedom in Scientology. For its treatment
of section 32 and its balancing of values, as well as for its failure to apply
section 1 to or consider the constitutionality of damages, this decision
represents section 2(b)'s lowest point in the first generation of section
2(b) jurisprudence.
D. PJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.): Evidence
and the Concept of Justification
PJR-MacDonald tested the constitutionality of provisions in the
Tobacco Products ControlAct,20 2 which, among other things, prohibited
tobacco advertising and compelled tobacco companies to place
unattributed warnings on packages. Despite rising concerns about
smoking and growing disapproval of the tobacco companies, the courts
were closely divided throughout: the legislation was struck down by the
trial judge,203 upheld on a 2-1 vote by the Quebec Court of Appeal,20 4
and then invalidated at the Supreme Court of Canada by a 5-4
20 0 Scientology, supra note 6 at 1188.
201 Supra note 134, L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
202 S.C. 1988, c. 20, ss. 4, 5 (prohibiting advertising), ss. 6, 8, (prohibiting promotion and
restricing trademark use); and s. 9 (compelling unattributed health warnings); reprinted in R.S.C.
1985 (4th Supp.), c. 14, as rep. by S.C. 1997, c. 13, s. 64 [hereinafter TPCA].
203 [1991] RJ.Q. 2260 (Sup. Ct.).
204 [1993] R.J.Q. 375.
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margin.205 In such circumstances, it was predictable that the Court's
decision would be controversial.206 At the same time, though JR-
MacDonald counts as a victory for expressive freedom, the Court's
opinions add little to the development of section 2(b)'s values. Although
McLachlin J.'s result prevailed, La Forest J.'s dissent was powerful. In
order to uphold the legislation, he proposed further modifications to the
Court's methodology.
His abhorrence of smoking is a relentless theme in the dissent.
Even so, the TPCA could not be easily saved under section 1. First, the
ban on advertising was compromised by a lack of evidence to establish a
causal link between tobacco promotion and consumption. In the face of
an adverse finding of fact at trial, it was doubtful that the government
could show a sufficient connection between the two.207 In addition, the
ban drew no distinction between informational messages and "lifestyle"
ads. The difficulty there was that an absolute prohibition could not
satisfy minimal impairment unless the government demonstrated the
necessity of banning all advertising, including messages that are purely
informational. To make matters worse, the government withheld its own
evidence on minimal impairment.208 Finally, the statute failed to
attribute its mandatory package warnings to the government. Once
again, the infringement could not pass minimal impairment unless the
government explained why the message could not be attributed to its
author.
Mr. Justice La Forest's approach to those flaws in the
government's case was to alter the standard of review. He began this
task by complaining that the trial judge in RIR-MacDonald treated Oakes
as a "test" that is "uniformly applicable in all circumstances" and, in
doing so, exchanged formalistic doctrine for the Charter's concept of
205 Supra note 9. All members of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation was
intra vires under the division of powers; McLachlin J. (Sopinka and Major JJ. concurring) and
lacobucci J. (Lamer C.J. concurring) invalidated its key provisions under s. 2(b) of the Charter,
L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier, and Cory JJ. concurred in La Forest J.'s dissent.
206 See D. Beatty, "Order in the Supreme Court! Ad-hockery is running wild" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (9 October 1995) All; A. Coyne, "The Supreme Court's Motto: Give me liberty, or
give me a good excuse" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (25 September 1995) A14; A. Hutchinson,
"Tobacco decision is a windfall for corporations" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (25 September
1995) A15; and D. Schneiderman, "A Comment on RIR-MacDonald v. Canada (A.G.)" (1996) 30
U.B.C. L. Rev. 165.
207 mR-MacDonald, supra note 9 at 285 (summarizing the trial judge's findings of fact on the
evidence).
208 Ibid. at 309-11.
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reasonable limits.209 He added that Oakes promotes abstract formalism
at the expense of section l's mandate to strike "a delicate balance," and
declared that balancing entails an "unavoidably normative inquiry."210
In his view, the guidelines of Oakes should be applied flexibly, according
to the "factual and social context of each case." 211 Ultimately, he stated
that section 1's evidentiary requirements would "vary substantially" from
case to case with the nature of the legislation and the right infringed.2 12
Under that standard the Charter's delicate balance is a matter of ad hoc
perception.
Like Cory J. in Scientology, La Forest J. only saw one side of the
equation in RIR-MacDonald. His analysis under Oakes began by
diverting attention from the legislation's ban on advertising to the
problems associated with consumption. He claimed that evidence about
tobacco consumption should play a role in determining "the appropriate
standard of justification and in weighing the relevant evidence." 213
Consumption was an important part of his analysis because the
detrimental effects of smoking filled a "significant gap" in the
evidence.214 To justify a restriction on advertising, the government must
ordinarily show that the infringement is linked to a valid objective of
consumer health and safety. In RjR-MacDonald, La Forest J. argued that
it is not necessary to show that a prohibition on advertising will advance
the government's objective of reducing tobacco consumption; it is
enough that the harmful effects of tobacco are known. Proving a link
between consumption and advertising would place an "impossible onus"
on Parliament. 21S To eliminate that onus, he characterized the gap in
the government's evidence as an "institutional constraint" that called for
deference by the courts and an attenuation of the Oakes test.216
His discussion of advertising provided a further rationale for
relaxing the standard of review. Following the methodology of Keegstra,
Butler, and Scientology, La Forest J. conducted a core-values analysis to
test the content of tobacco promotion against "a set of even more
209 IbM" at 269-70.
210 Ibid at 270.
211 IbM"
212 IbM" at 272.
213 IbMa at 273.
214 Ib. at 275.
215 Ibi.
2161i4 at 276.
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fundamental values."217 Under that analysis, he concluded that tobacco
advertising is entitled to "a very low degree of protection under s.1,"
because it is profit-seeking, serves no political, scientific, or artistic ends
and does not promote participation in the political process.218 In doing
so, La Forest J. found closer parallels in Keegstra, Butler, and the
Prostitution Reference,219 which deal with Criminal Code provisions, than
in decisions such as Rocket, which balance goals of consumer protection
against access to information about lawful products and services.2 20 He
repeated that an attenuated section 1 test was appropriate because
tobacco advertising is "as far" from the core of section 2(b)'s values as
prostitution, hate mongering, or pornography.221 To summarize, before
even addressing proportionality, La Forest J. discounted the Oakes test
in favour of a flexible approach that would permit the Court to alter
section l's evidentiary requirements. Under the first branch of the test
he emphasized the harms associated with the product's consumption to
support a ban on advertising. Then, to further dilute the review he
compared ads which promote a legal product to expressive activity that is
prohibited by the Criminal Code. It is difficult to imagine how any
legislation could fail this standard of justification.
Mr. Justice La Forest's attenuation of review continued under
the proportionality test. There, he equated the rational connection
requirement with "common sense" to fill a gap in the evidence. 222
Lacking evidence of a demonstrable link between advertising and
consumption, La Forest J. held that the power of common sense would
suffice: advertising must be connected to consumption, he reasoned,
because it would otherwise make no sense for the companies to
advertise.223 He buttressed that line of analysis with Butler and its
"common sense ... connection" between pornography and harm.224
There, the Court held that pornographic material can be limited
because it is antithetical to equality values. Although it is doubtful
whether the analogy is apt, it is painfully obvious that a common sense
2 171bid. at 280.
218 Ibid. at 282-83.
219 Supra note 5.
2 2 0 PjR-MacDonald, supra note 9 at 282.
221 IbL
2 2 2 Ibid. at 290-94 and 304.
223 Ibid. at 291.
224 Ibid at 292-93.
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standard of constitutionality can only have one purpose, and that is to
save infringements that cannot satisfy any higher standard of proof.2 25
The minimal impairment test posed a second evidentiary hurdle
for La Forest J. There, the difficulty was that the government
introduced no evidence to explain why an absolute ban was necessary to
achieve its objective. It is clear, on the wording of section 1 and under
all the Court's jurisprudence, that the burden of justification is on the
government. To solve that evidentiary problem, La Forest J. turned the
burden on its head and upheld the legislation because there was no
evidence that the ban did not satisfy minimal impairment. In the
absence of evidence to demonstrate a minimal impairment he stated that
"it would be highly artificial for the Court to decide, on a purely abstract
basis, that a partial prohibition would be as effective." 226 In his view, the
legislation would only fail "if it had been 'clear to Parliament that some
forms of advertising do not stimulate consumption."227 That analysis
essentially reversed the burden of proof: instead of requiring the
government to offer affirmative evidence of minimal impairment it
assumed, in the absence of clear proof to the contrary, that the
infringement satisfied that requirement. Although he refused to
speculate that a partial prohibition might have been as effective La
Forest J. found it "reasonable to conclude" that all advertising stimulates
consumption.228 In effect, he invented a presumption of minimal
impairment and then upheld the infringement when it was not rebutted.
How it could have been rebutted and by whom, given the government's
refusal to present evidence, is a mystery.
La Forest J.'s contortions of analysis have dark implications for
section 2(b). His approach is capable of saving any legislation, whatever
its flaws, and his aversion to values of consistency and proportionality is
alarming. The theory of Oakes is that structured criteria are necessary
to minimize the risk that arbitrary, subjective and ad hoc perceptions
may compromise the section 1 analysis. The RI-MacDonald dissent
225 Limits on pornography and tobacco advertising are based on different theories of harm.
Pornography was held to be harmful in Butler, supra note 4, because it violates the equality of
women generally, regardless of whether individuals suffer direct harm. By contrast, tobacco
advertising is only harmful if it increases consumption, and individuals are harmed by having fallen
prey to its persuasion. The evidence in =I-MacDonald did not support that link. Assuming the
correctness of Butler's conclusion that women are harmed generally by pornography, it is difficult to
see how tobacco advertising is harmful unless it does increase consumption.
2 26 PJR-MacDonald, supra note 9 at 312 [emphasis added].
2 27 1bML at 311 [emphasis added].
2 281bid.
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illustrates that eliminating the Oakes test's constraints in favour of
flexibility can only undercut the Charter's commitment to expressive
freedom and undermine the integrity of section 1 review.
It cannot have been easy for McLachlin J. to write in defence of
tobacco companies and their promotional activities. In the
circumstances, however, some response to a dissent that would have
emasculated section 2(b) was imperative if expressive freedom is to have
any meaning under the Charter. Her opinion invalidating the legislation
was at once strong and ambivalent: it was strong because she defended a
principled conception of section 1, but ambivalent because section 2(b)'s
values played a limited role in her analysis. She made a persuasive
argument on the evidence but failed, in doing so, to affirm or enrich the
Court's commitment to expressive freedom.
McLachlin J. took issue with the dissenting opinion on several
points. First, she proposed an alternative to La Forest J.'s methodology
that is "evidence-based." Her reasons make clear that she regards the
contextual approach as a factual and evidentiary concept, and the
section 1 analysis as a "fact-specific inquiry" which requires the courts to
"take[] into account the context in which the particular law is situate."229
As McLachlin J. explained, review under section 1 examines the "actual
objective" of the law, and determines the "actual connection" between
that objective and what the law achieves, the "actual degree" to which it
impairs the right, and whether the "actual benefit" of the law outweighs
the "actual seriousness" of the violation.230 Her approach is aimed at
resolving tensions or incompatibilities between the situational focus of
pre-Charter common law methodology and the structured framework of
constitutional analysis. When juxtaposed, the majority and minority
approaches expose a significant divergence of views: whereas McLachlin
J. treats context as a mechanism for relating constitutional principles to
the facts and circumstances of particular cases, La Forest J. regards it as
a rationale for lowering section l's standard of review. Under her
section 1 analysis the relevant variable is the evidence; under his it is the
standard itself.
McLachlin J. also claimed that the dissent had attenuated the
government's burden under section 1 to an extreme that diminished the
role of the courts and weakened the structure of rights under the
Charter. She insisted, instead, that the analysis be based on reason,
reasoned demonstration, and rational inference, because to relax those
2 2 9 PjR-MacDonald, supra note 9 at 330.
230 Ibid. at 331 [emphasis added]
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requirements would effectively grant Parliament the right to determine
the limits of its intrusion on Charter rights.231 Unlike La Forest J., she
regarded the government's refusal to disclose evidence in its possession
or to present any other evidence on minimal impairment as an affront,
both to the Court and to the Charter. For her, RT-MacDonald was less
about transcending issues of expressive freedom than the "bottom line"
under section 1: that the government has the burden to provide a
reasoned demonstration that its violation of a constitutional right is
justifiable.232 That bottom line was at stake in RR-MacDonald because
the Charter's rights would have no force and meaning unless that
standard is enforced by the judiciary.233
Not only did she question the dissent's framework for section 1
review, McLachlin J. challenged its characterization of the legislative
objective and analysis of minimal impairment. Although she concluded
that "[e]ven a small reduction in tobacco use" is sufficiently important to
warrant limits on advertising, 23 4 she cautioned that "[c]are must be taken
not to overstate the objective."235 By conflating the known harm
inherent in consumption with the impact of advertising, which was
speculative at best, that is exactly what La Forest J. did. Then, under
minimal impairment, he juxtaposed advertising's "low value" with the
transcending importance of reducing tobacco consumption. As
McLachlin J. observed, however, the minimal impairment test does not
contemplate a balancing of values; its purpose instead is to determine
whether the impairment is greater than necessary in the circumstances.
Noting that La Forest J. had re-balanced the values to rationalize yet
another attenuation of review she cautioned that "care must be taken
not to devalue the need for a demonstration of minimum impairment by
arguing that the legislation is important and the infringement of no great
moment."236 In any case, McLachlin J. stated that the Court's analysis
should neither overvalue the legislative objective nor undervalue the
expressive activity in question. In effect, the dissenting opinion imposed
a burden on the tobacco companies to establish "the true benefits" of
their advertising.23 7 That was inappropriate, in her view, because the
231 Ibid. at 328-29.
23 2 Ibid. at 329.
2 3 3 Ibid.
2 3 4 Ibid. at 336.
235 Ibid at 335.
2 3 6 lbidL at 347.
23 7 1bid. at 347-48.
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onus under section 1 is on the government, not the party claiming the
entitlement. Finally, she rejected the suggestion that expressive freedom
can be compromised by the profit motive. In an attempt to retain the
focus on justification, she stated that the motive behind protected
activity is "irrelevant to the determination of whether the government
has established that the law is reasonable or justified .... "238
Although she confronted the dissent's conception of section 1,
McLachlin J.'s commitment to expressive freedom should itself not be
overstated. She invalidated the legislation on narrow evidentiary
grounds, under minimal impairment, and deferred to Parliament at
important stages of the analysis. Her conclusion that a small reduction
in tobacco use could justify the violation of constitutional rights set a low
threshold under the first branch of Oakes.239  In addition, after
emphasizing the importance of reason, logic, and reasoned
demonstration, she adopted a common sense standard under the
rational connection test. There, she cited Butler240 and its reliance on
the American Meese Commission on Pornography, which proposed the
following the test of connection: "would [it] be surprising ... to find
otherwise?" 241 In other words, it would be such a surprise or so counter-
intuitive to discover that tobacco advertising does not promote smoking
that a rational connection between the ban and a reduction in
consumption can be assumed. Once again, it is difficult to imagine how
legislation could fail a standard that can so easily explain the violation of
a constitutional right.
PJR-MacDonald was a victory for section 2(b), but a pyrrhic one
at that. McLachlin J. advocated an evidence-based concept of section 1
review and confirmed, as a matter of institutional policy, that the Court
will require the government to demonstrate the justifiability of laws that
violate section 2(b). She disputed the dissent's conception of section 1
but diverged in her application of the test only on the question of
minimal impairment. The claim prevailed on a point of evidence and
broader principles of expressive freedom were not engaged.
238 Ibid. at 348.
239 Supra note 19.
240 Supra note 4.
241 PuR-MacDonald, supra note 9 at 341, citing United States, Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography: Final Report, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice, 1986) at 326.
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E. Ross and Carson: The Emergence of La Forest J.
PJR-MacDonald was decided nearly two years ago. Since then,
the most significant development under section 2(b) is the emergence of
La Forest J. as the Court's spokesperson on these issues. Twice since
RJR-MacDonald he has written in important cases and both times he
spoke for the full Court. First, his decision in Ross upheld a teacher's
removal from the classroom for views he expressed outside the school, as
a member of the public.242 More recently, his judgment in Carson saved
the Criminal Code's provision that permits judges to exclude the public
from all or part of criminal proceedings, but reversed the trial judge's
order closing part of a hearing on sentence.243
Ross arose from a complaint and proceedings under human
rights legislation which concerned a schoolteacher's off-duty anti-Semitic
expressive activity and its impact on the school environment. In
reviewing the board of inquiry's orders, the Court considered whether
the school board's failure to take action constituted discrimination, and
what sanctions, if any, should be imposed on the teacher. It upheld the
board's order removing him from the classroom but invalidated the
condition that his employment in a non-teaching position be terminated
should he revive his extra-curricular activities.244
The Court's methodology was a central factor in the outcome.
Though section 2(b) was not discussed, the board of inquiry's finding of
discrimination vitally affected the section 1 analysis. In the
circumstances, La Forest J.'s decision to adopt that finding before the
Charter was engaged pre-empted the rational connection test. On the
question of discrimination, there was no evidence that Ross had engaged
in anti-Semitic activity while on duty, and no direct evidence that his
extra-curricular activities had any impact on the school environment.245
242 Ross, supra note 8.
243 Supra note 14, upholding the constitutionality of s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code. The
provision grants a discretion to a trial judge to exclude the public from criminal proceedings if the
judge "is of the opinion that it is in the interest of public morals, the maintenance of order or the
proper administration to [do so]."
244 The board of inquiry ordered the school board to place Ross on an eighteen-month leave
of absence without pay; to appoint him to a non-teaching position in that period if one became
available; to terminate his employment if he had not been offered and had not accepted such a
position in that period; and to terminate his employment immediately upon the revival of any of the
activities complained of, during the leave of absence or in a non-teaching position: Ross, supra note
8 at 838-39.
245 ibid. at 856.
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The board of inquiry found discrimination nonetheless, because it
"would be reasonable to anticipate" that the teacher's outside activities
were a factor in influencing the discriminatory conduct of some
students.246 Mr. Justice La Forest upheld that finding because a
"reasonable inference" was sufficient to support the conclusion that the
teacher's activity "impaired the educational environment generally."247
Unfortunately, that conclusion answered the rational connection test
before the Charter analysis even began.2 48 As a result, La Forest J.
Simply recited that finding under section 1: the removal order was
rationally connected to the objective of preventing discrimination
because it was reasonable to presume or anticipate the causal
relationship; in such circumstances, the removal order would deny Ross
the opportunity to influence students, whether he had in the past or not.
Not only was a key part of the section 1 analysis resolved in advance
against expressive freedom, in the absence of proof that the teacher's
views did have consequences, the distinction between value and harm
was once again collapsed.
Under section 2(b) of the Charter, the Court continues to insist,
as did La Forest J. in Ross, that the scope of protection of expression is
"very broad" and that "freedom of expression serves to protect the right
of the minority to express its views, however unpopular. such views may
be."249 Despite its professed disdain for formalism and abstraction in
Charter interpretation, such statements about expressive freedom are
valid only at the highest level of abstract formalism. As Keegstra, Butler,
the RR-MacDonald dissent, and Ross confirm, the Court pays little or no
price for protecting unpopular views under section 2(b) because limits
on such expressive activity can be easily justified under its section 1
methodology.
La Forest J.'s constitutional analysis in Ross carefully drew
parallels between his approach and that of McLachlin J. Under section
2(b) he cited her majority opinion in Zunde2SO and claimed that both the
"majority and minority agreed" in RIR-MacDonald that a uniform section
1 test must be eschewed in favour of flexibility.251 Soon thereafter he
246 Ibid. [emphasis added].
247 Ibid. at 860, citing Fraser v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board), [1985] 2 S.C.R.
455, which was not decided under the Charter.
248 Ibid. at 880-82.
249 Ibid. at 864.
25 0 Ibid. at 864-65.
251 Ibid. at 871-72.
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reasserted the central point of his RJR-MacDonald dissent, that section
l's evidentiary requirements "will vary substantially depending upon
both the nature of the legislation and the nature of the right
infringed." 252 He strengthened the impression of solidarity among
members of the Court by citing McLachlin J. in the next two sentences.
As a result, the Court unanimously agreed that the standard of review
under section 1 is contingent on ad hoc perceptions of the relative value
of regulation and freedom in any given case.
In establishing a framework for balancing values under section 1,
the Court explored the three contexts considered relevant by the New
Brunswick Human Rights Commission: the educational, the
employment, and the anti-Semitism contexts.253 Excluded from that
framework of analysis was any consideration of expressive freedom and
the consequences of violating a constitutionally protected right. Once
again, La Forest J. held that the board of inquiry's approach to
discrimination reflected an appropriate "balancing of values" before
section 2(b) was considered. 254 Only after reaching that conclusion did
he turn to expressive freedom. There, he twice inferred that the board's
orders against Ross did not violate the Charter, stating first that "[t]he
nature of the right allegedly infringed in this case is of equal
significance," and then adding that, when the form of expression
"allegedly infringed lies further from the 'core' values of freedom of
expression," a lower standard of justification is appropriate.255 In the
circumstances, he quickly found that anti-Semitic expressive activity is
tenuously connected to section 2(b)'s values. The standard of review
was lowered and proportionality satisfied, with the exception of the final
order imposing a permanent ban on the teacher's expressive activity,
which failed minimal impairment2 56
Nowhere in the section 1 analysis were the orders' consequences
for expressive freedom discussed. Under the final stage of the
proportionality test, where a deleterious effects-salutary benefits analysis
is now required, La Forest J. simply stated that the teacher's expressive
252 Ibid. at 876.
253 Ibid. at 872-76.
254Ibid at 876. In reaching that conclusion he noted that the board "carefully considered the
effect on the respondent" Ross, but otherwise did not mention or discuss s. 2(b)'s values.
255Ibkd at 876-77 [emphasis added].
256 Ibid. at 884. There, the Court held that the evidence did not support the conclusion that
the "residual poisoned effect" would last once Ross was placed in a non-teaching role.
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freedom was unrestricted.257 Not only did that conclusion gloss over the
price Ross paid for holding offensive views, it overlooked a key element
of the deleterious effects analysis. It is not only the consequences for
one individual, but also for the principle of expressive freedom, that
should be considered in this analysis. In Keegstra, McLachlin J. urged
the majority to consider the chilling effects of limits on offensive
expression under section 1: in Ross, however, the Court did not see it as
a factor, despite the risk of self-censorship, and the decision's potential
to silence teachers both in and out of school.
In spite of the Court's section 2(b) rhetoric and with the
exception of the result in Zundel, controversial views have virtually no
protection under the Charter. As a result of Ross, the Court's aversion to
unpopular and offensive expression is entrenched in a methodology that
treats context as a proxy for content under section 1, equates subjective
perceptions of value with constitutional principles, and dilutes section l's
requirements of harm and proportionality to the vanishing point. The
fear of formalism that has been voiced by members of the Court in
rejecting the constraints of Oakes is entirely misplaced: formalism is the
defining feature of section 2(b), not of section 1.258
Meanwhile, the jurisprudence that followed Dagenais, namely
Scientology, RIR-MacDonald, and Ross, made little effort to enrich or
develop section 2(b)'s values. Although it upheld section 486(1) of the
Criminal Code, Carson broke the pattern of those cases.259 In doing so
La Forest J. articulated a concept of access under section 2(b) that is
based on principles of openness and democratic accountability, as well as
on a strong recognition that newsgathering is vital to freedom of the
press. He vindicated the statutory provision that authorizes judges to
close the courtroom but fettered the trial judge's discretion to exclude
the public by reading a Dagenais-like test into the "proper
administration of justice" under section 486(1) of the Code.
That provision does not limit expression and cannot infringe the
Charter unless section 2(b) guarantees a right of access to judicial
proceedings. As noted in Part II, above, the Court was unable to
establish any approach to access in Commonwealth.260 In Carson,
257 Ibid at 885 (concluding that he was only prevented from expressing certain views and
holding a teaching position at the same time).
258 See, for example, Keegstra, supra note 3 and text accompanying notes 68-71, supra; and RIR-
MacDonald, supra note 9.
2 5 9 Supra note 14.
260 Supra note 15.
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however, the strong pedigree of openness and publicity at common law
may have placed the claim on a higher plane. Not only did he invoke
access and democratic accountability under section 2(b), La Forest J.
linked both values to the newsgathering function of the press.261 For the
first time since McLachlin J.'s dissent in Keegstra, principles of expressive
freedom played a valuable role in the Charter analysis. Moreover, unlike
Commonwealth, where six of seven judges restricted the scope of section
2(b), the Court in Carson rejected the suggestion that section 486(1)
represents an accommodation of values that do not violate section 2(b)
and held, instead, that competing interests must be balanced under
section 1.262
After explaining why section 486(1) is justifiable, La Forest J.
added to the foundation of Dagenais by showing how the chief justice's
publication ban rule could apply to the exercise of the discretion to
exclude.263 On that point, his reasons were reminiscent of McLachlin
J.'s opinion in PJR-MacDonald because of his emphasis on the need for a
sufficient evidentiary basis to support any limit on the right.264
Significantly, La Forest J. also integrated the values at stake into his
application of the Dagenais test. As he explained, the order closing part
of the sentencing hearing implicated the interests of the victims and even
the accused, as well as the values served by access, including deterrence
and public denunciation. On balance, he concluded that "permitting
the public to determine what punishment fits a given crime, and whether
sentences reflect consistency and proportionality" should prevail.265 The
order was not necessary and its deleterious consequences were not
outweighed by its salutary effects.266
Carson highlighted values of consistency and proportionality
which apply, a fortiori, to the section 1 analysis. In doing so it reinforced
261 Carson, supra note 14 at 493-99.
262 Ibid. at 499-502.
263 In the context of s. 486(1), the judge must consider the available options and consider
whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available, and whether the order is
limited as much as possible; in addition, the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of
the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular
expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order
are proportionate: ibid. at 515-16.
264 Ibid. at 516-18.
265 Ibid. at 523 [emphasis added].
266Ibid. Compare La Forest J.'s conclusion in Carson-that there was insufficient evidence to
support a concern for undue hardship, that the order was not necessary, and that its deleterious
effects were not outweighed by its salutary benefits--with his s. 1 analysis in Ross, supra note 8.
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the Court's commitment to those values and demonstrated its
willingness to protect section 2(b)'s principles. La Forest J. also
confirmed that the exercise of a discretion, whether at common law or
under statute, is subject to the Charter. His opinion demonstrated once
again how the basic concepts of the Oakes test can be adapted to bring
pre-existing doctrine or statutory standards into compliance with the
Charter. Most importantly, by discussing the competing values at stake,
he added the step that was missing in Dagenais.
Still, Carson must be read alongside Ross and other decisions
which have abandoned section 2(b)'s principles to an ad hoc concept of
context under section 1. Not only does that jurisprudence lack in
consistency, its attenuation of review under section 1, including proof of
a demonstrable harm and minimal impairment, represents a rejection of
proportionality. The difference between Ross and Carson, and the
different lines of jurisprudence each represents, can be summed up in
two words: subjective perception. Section 2(b) tends to prevail when the
Court perceives the expressive activity at stake to be valuable, and fails
when the content of the entitlement is considered valueless. If
formalism is the fatal flaw of section 2(b), subjective perception is the
fundamental assumption, and also the fatal flaw, of the Court's
conception of section 1.
IV. THE NEXT GENERATION
A. A Methodology for the Future
The first generation of jurisprudence and its methodological
flaws have been discussed at length. Primary among those flaws is Ford's
assumption that the right and its limits are separate analytical concepts.
Despite the Charter's textual structure, that interpretation of the
relationship between the two is fundamentally unsound. Just as
restrictions on the scope of the right would have to be based on a
conclusion that it is justifiable to exclude certain expression from the
Charter, reasonable limits under section 1 must likewise rest on a
balancing of values which incorporates some evaluation of the expressive
activity at stake. In addition, Irwin Toy's unlimited definition of the right
was abstract, and failed, as such, to offer any criteria for distinguishing
between claims. Wilson J.'s contextual approach attempted to close the
gap between sections 2(b) and 1, and to ground the analysis of expressive
freedom in the facts and circumstances of particular cases. Although it
succeeded in relating section 2(b)'s guarantee to section l's mandate of
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reasonable limits, her approach did so at the expense of Irwin Toy's
principle of freedom. Together, these developments produced a
methodology that marginalized section 2(b)'s rationales for protecting
expressive freedom and substituted ad hoc decisionmaking for a
principled balancing of values. Carson's principles of consistency and
proportionality for sentencing should a fortiori be the hallmarks of
justification under section 1. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of
Canada does not observe those principles in its section 2(b)
jurisprudence.
The Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Thomson Newspapers
Co. v. Canada (A. G.)267 illustrates how stunted the Charter's conception
of expressive freedom has become. Soon to be heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada, Thomson Newspapers is instructive as an example of
what is wrong with the section 2(b) jurisprudence. There, the court
upheld an absolute publication ban on opinion surveys during the final
seventy-two hours of a federal election campaign, in full awareness that
there was no empirical evidence that such polls affect the outcome of
elections.268
Nowhere in its reasons did the Ontario Court of Appeal discuss
section 2(b)'s values or acknowledge the central role information plays
in an election process. To make matters worse, the Court expanded the
scope of section 322.1 of the cEA, thereby maximizing the constitutional
violation, before even reaching the Charter.269 Then, without exploring
whether opinion surveys in an election campaign lie at the core of
section 2(b), as they surely must, the court applied a relaxed standard of
section 1 review. In the absence of any concrete evidence of harm, it
held that "[i]t is surely a substantial and pressing objective to respond to
widespread perceptions that opinion surveys can be distorting ... "27o
267 (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 350 [hereinafter Thomson Newspapers]; leave to appeal to Supreme
Court of Canada granted 3 March 1997: [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 510 (QL).
268 Section 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, as am. by S.C. 1993, c. 19, s.
125, [hereinafter cEA] imposes a three-day blackout period on the publication of opinion surveys
during a federal election campaign. The court conceded in Thomson Newspapers, supra note 267 at
353, that there is "no empirical evidence as to the extent or nature of the influence of opinion polls
upon the voter .... "
269 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 267 at 357. After interpreting the section to include
hamburger and other non-scientific polls, the court concluded that it should also apply to the
re-publication of pre-blackout polls. It supported that view by observing that "[w]hile it may be that
Parliament intended to restrict the scope of the prohibition to new, previously undisclosed survey
results, we are not convinced, in the absence of any words in the legislation to that effect, that such
was necessarily the intention."
270 Ibid. at 359 [emphasis added].
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Under proportionality it applied Butler's reasoned apprehension of harm
test, and found a rational connection on the strength of the observation
that "[tihere was serious controversy on a social scientific subject ....
combined with the manifest fact that the publication of bare results does
not tell the whole story and thus may well be misleading." 271 After
reading section 322.1 up, to expand its regulatory scope, it was unlikely
that the court would strike the provision for failing to satisfy minimal
impairment.2? 2 Finally, although the Court of Appeal failed to apply a
deleterious effects-salutary benefits analysis, it claimed that the effect of
the ban was "nominal" because "[i]t is the newspaper industry, urging its
own interests and those of the public in these proceedings."273 For the
court to describe the violation as nominal, in light of the press function
and public interest in access to information during elections, is short-
sighted at best.
If section 2(b) has a core, then expressive activity located at that
core is entitled to strong protection under the Charter. While the
Supreme Court of Canada has decided that pornography, defamation,
and hate propaganda stray from that core, other activity, such as election
campaign surveys, are unquestionably closer to its centre. The result in
Thomson Newspapers, whereby expressive activity having a direct bearing
on the democratic process did not prevail, highlights the imbalance of
the current methodology. Section 2(b)'s values never work in favour of
the guarantee, and experience has shown that when expressive freedom
is not valued, evidence of harm is not required. The status of public
opinion polls aside, Thomson Newspapers challenges the Supreme Court
of Canada to recalibrate a methodology of expressive freedom that has
strayed a long way from section 2(b)'s principles.
The next sections sketch out the broad outlines of a methodology
which would reduce the inconsistency and unpredictability of the section
2(b) jurisprudence. It proceeds in three steps. The first explains why
expressive freedom's values should be an equal partner in the analysis,
and proposes two presumptions or principles that would equalize the
balancing of values under section 1. Without further modifications, that
step would significantly alter the Court's methodology, because it is
based on the assumption that the rationales for protecting the right must
be balanced fairly against the government's justifications for limiting it.
271 Ibid. at 360.
272 Ibid. (concluding that any prohibition which was not absolute would be arbitrary and
uncertain).
2 7 3 Ibid. [emphasis added].
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The two framework principles or presumptions do not stand alone,
however. Because they affect the analysis, the second step explains how
those principles interact with Oakes. Finally, the proposed framework
principles, especially Irwin Toy's commitment to freedom for all
expressions of the heart and mind, are inconsistent with what has been
referred to throughout this article as a "core-values analysis": a
methodology that treats context as a proxy for content and cites section
2(b)'s abstract goals to diminish the Charter's protection for particular
expressive activity. The final step resolves that conflict by suggesting a
variation on the contextual approach, which is based on the proposition
that the section 1 analysis can neither be monolithic nor purely ad
hoc-the contextual approach taken to an extreme. The goal is an
analysis that is at once principled and contextual. Put another way, the
Court needs to develop rules of justification that establish principles for
balancing the values at stake in diverse contexts. The discussion in the
next section explains how these three steps can work together to protect
section 2(b)'s values under section 1, preserve the discipline of Oakes
and accommodate the need for flexibility.
B. Framework Principles: Bridging the Conceptual Gap
Madam Justice McLachlin's dissent in Keegstra claimed that
section l's balancing of values must incorporate the characteristics that
relate "peculiarly to the nature of expressive freedom." 274 What that
means, in the terminology of this article, is that the Charter's equilibrium
cannot be preserved unless section 2(b)'s rationales are factored into the
balancing of rights and limits under section 1. Indirectly, Lamer C.J.
answered McLachlin J.'s plea in Dagenais by proposing a deleterious
effects-salutary benefits analysis in the last stage of the proportionality
test.
Despite those endeavours, the right's values do not play an
equivalent role in the section 1 analysis. While the Court does not
strictly adhere to it, Oakes is dominant; unfortunately, though, with the
exception of the final step of the proportionality analysis, the test was
not designed to balance values. In an effort to introduce a concept of
balancing, expressive freedom's values were incorporated into the
contextual approach and then relegated to the proportionality analysis.
Subsequently, the Court began considering general principles at the
outset of section 1, though in doing so equated context with flexibility.
2 74 Supra note 3.
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As a result, it substantially abandoned Oakes in favour of an open-ended
standard of justification.275 To the extent that section 2(b)'s values
influence justification, they do so selectively to rationalize limits: the
Court's core-values analysis is a one-way street that validates limits
without granting section 2(b) sufficient protection under section 1.
The enduring lesson of the first generation jurisprudence is that
a broad definition of section 2(b) is an empty gesture unless the
principles and rationales for protecting expressive freedom influence the
section 1 analysis. Although the text of the Charter promoted an
interpretation that separated the scope of the entitlement from the
justifiability of limits, experience has shown that the two parts of the
equation are neither conceptually nor analytically distinct. When the
Court in Irwin Toy adopted an unlimited definition of expressive
freedom, values could only be balanced and compared in one place,
under section 1. Instead of harmonizing the two, however, the
jurisprudence created a dichotomy between the Court's conception of
expressive freedom and its core-values analysis under section 1. The
Court's definition of the right is based on an assumption of content
neutrality and its section 1 review, on the converse proposition that the
content or value of the expression should determine the degree of
constitutional protection it receives. If Charter methodology is to have
any coherence, that dichotomy must be resolved. Irwin Toy's definition
of freedom is more than an abstract principle under section 2(b); it is, in
addition, a vital part of the balancing of values.
Irwin Toy's declaration of freedom for all expressions of the
heart and mind-or content neutrality as it is described in American
doctrine-is not an indigenous concept. In the United States it
represents the culmination of a First Amendment renaissance that began
in the Cold War climate of the 1950s with NAACP v. Button276 and gained
momentum throughout the 1960s era of civil unrest and widespread
protest. 277 The "felt necessities" of those times required a constitutional
principle to check acts of censorship against messages that were
perceived as hostile, offensive or unpatriotic. Curiously, though'a
dissident tradition is strongly rooted in American experience, content
neutrality did not crystallize as a commandment of the First Amendment
until 1972, when the United States Supreme Court declared, as a matter
275 See, for example, Ross, supra note 8; and RiR-MacDonald supra note 9 (dissenting opinion).
276 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating attempts by a state legislature to prevent the civil rights
organization from operating within Virginia).
277 See generally "First Amendment and Section 1," supra note 28 at 93-113 (analyzing the
evolution of the principle of content neutrality).
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of doctrine, that the state cannot prohibit speech because of its content.
The principle is based on an assumption that there must be
neutrality-or equality-in the field of ideas, because any other rule of
constitutional interpretation would concede an impermissible degree of
power to the state to regulate the content of speech.278
Years later, under section 2(b) of the Charter, content neutrality
lacked a concrete foundation in historical experience, legal doctrine, or a
tradition of dissent. Even so, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized
that not being censored or punished for expressing unpopular views is
the essence of the guarantee. From the beginning, however, the
difficulty was that Irwin Toy's principle of freedom is abstract and
unavoidably acontextual, because objectionable expressive activity can
only be protected by disregarding its content. As such, it runs up against
a strong instinct that valueless or offensive expression should be
excluded from the Charter. The dilemma of expressive freedom is that it
pulls in opposite directions: by promoting its highest ideals and
challenging its most cherished values, expressive freedom offers the best
and threatens the worst of democratic society. While instinct demands
that offensive expression be excluded from the Constitution, history
confirms over and again how harmful it is to suppress unpopular ideas.
In principle, the Charter should resist instinct and summon the courage
to protect the thoughts and ideas that are valued the least and feared the
most. At the same time, it is easy to disapprove of censorship but far
more difficult to run the risk of harm, which so often lurks in the shadow
of speculation but is an unavoidable cost of expressive freedom.
Before turning to harm and its role in the Oakes test the
principle of expressive freedom must be brought into the section 1
analysis. Doing so can connect the two sides of an equation which are
currently in conflict, and provide a stronger safeguard against limits on
expression that is unpopular or offensive. Those objectives can be
accomplished through the introduction of a presumption that any
content-based infringement of section 2(b) is prima facie unjustifiable.
Although a section 1 analysis is not undertaken unless a constitutional
violation has been established, a presumption against content-based
violations is necessary to honour Irwin Toy's principle of freedom for all
expressions of the heart and mind.
McLachlin J. has noted that it is inappropriate to focus on the
value of the entitlement under section 1.279 A presumption that it is
278 Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
2 79 Keegstra, supra note 3; and pJrR-MacDonald, supra note 9.
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prima facie unjustifiable for the government to target particular
expressive activity would redirect the Court's attention to section l's
mandate of justification. To rebut that presumption, the government
would have to demonstrate that its breach of section 2(b) serves a
legitimate, non-censorial objective. In other words, its burden would be
to establish a harm independent of the perception that the content of the
expressive activity is offensive or valueless. By demanding careful
scrutiny of any violation of section 2(b)'s principle of freedom, this
presumption acknowledges the risk that the government may have
committed an impermissible act of censorship. Incorporating that
presumption into the balancing of values recognizes that risk and
honours the government's burden of justification under section 1.280
Before turning to the Oakes test, a second presumption or
framework principle should be mentioned. Legislation which targets
particular expressive activity because of its content is problematic
because of the risk that certain views may have been selectively
punished. Absolute prohibitions on expression are problematic for a
different reason: without targeting particular views, total bans impose a
blanket prohibition on a constitutionally protected right. Although the
Court has held that such measures are difficult to justify under minimal
impairment, a similar presumption against total bans on expression
should also form part of the general framework of principle for section 1
review.281 Treating an absolute prohibition as a question of minimal
impairment is not adequate because it denies that violation the threshold
importance it should have in the section 1 analysis. There too, the
presumption would impose a strict burden on the government to
establish the need for such an uncompromising violation of the right.
Together, these presumptions create framework principles which
recognize the entitlement side of the equation and confirm the
government's burden of justification under section 1. By addressing the
imbalance of the current methodology, these modifications set the right
and its limits on an even plane. In addition, by incorporating section
2(b)'s principle of freedom into the structure of section 1, these
presumptions bridge the conceptual gap between sections 2(b) and 1.
How they might affect the Oakes test remains to be determined. As well,
280 Step two of Invin Toy's s. 2(b) test, supra note 38, which stated that purposeful violations of
s. 2(b) should proceed directly to s. 1, has never played an important role in the analysis. As a
result, little or no doctrinal significance attaches to content-based infringements of expressive
freedom. The suspicion or skepticism that is appropriate in such circumstances is reflected in a
presumption, under s. 1, against content-based violations of s. 2(b).
28 1 Ramsden, supra note 15; and PJR-MacDonald, supra note 9.
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a presumption against content-based limits is incompatible with the
Court's core-values approach, which assumes, to the contrary, that an
attenuated standard of justification applies to expressive activity which is
designated "low-value." How the proposal relates to the Oakes test and
how the contextual approach fits into the scheme are discussed in the
next two sections.
C. The Oakes Test: Structure and Principle
1. Branch 1: the objective
The first branch of the Oakes test requires the government to
establish a substantial and pressing objective for infringing expressive
freedom. Early in section 2(b)'s evolution the stringency suggested by
that language was alleviated by Irwin Toy's standard of
reasonableness.2 2 Since then, the legitimacy of the government's
objective has only been rejected once under section 2(b).283 A
presumption against content-based limits would change this element of
the Oakes test by requiring the government to establish a non-censorial
objective that is unrelated to disapproval of the activity's content or to a
perception that it lacks redeeming value. Put another way, prohibiting
expressive activity simply because of its content would be patently
unjustifiable under this branch of Oakes. In the absence of a harm or a
regulatory objective that is separate from an activity's content,
expression which is merely objectionable should be protected.
On the question of valid objectives, one issue is whether other
Charter values, such as equality, multiculturalism and privacy, can
override section 2(b). An affirmative answer suggests that expressive
activity can be limited because other values are considered inherently
more important. As seen above, the Court preferred equality and
multiculturalism in Keegstra and Butler without weighing expressive
freedom or considering the consequences for section 2(b).
Subsequently, Dagenais warned against any hierarchy of values under the
Charter, and admonished that expressive freedom cannot be prohibited
282 Supra note 9 at 986 and 990 (stating that a high standard of justification should apply
under this branch and then concluding that the legislature's objective was reasonable).
283 Zundel, supra note 6 at 764-65, McLachlin J. (holding that s. 181 of the Criminal Code did
not relate to a substantial and pressing objective under s. 1).
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because other interests are automatically or reflexively preferred.284 As
a matter of text, there is no basis for the preferences that are entrenched
in Keegstra, Butler, Scientology, and Ross. Moreover, as a matter of
methodology, the Court should not have privileged those values without
weighing the competing interest in expressive freedom against them.
For that reason, the section I analysis should require the government to
establish a legitimate regulatory objective that is unrelated to mere
disapproval of the activity or to any automatic preference for competing
values. The relationship between branch one of Oakes, and the
requirement of a rational connection which forms part of the
proportionality analysis, is discussed below.
2. Branch 2: proportionality
Harm is the key to section 2(b)'s principle of freedom as well as
to section l's concept of justifiable limits: where harm is present, limits
are justifiable, and where it is absent, the principle of freedom must
prevail. Two of the biggest problems with the current approach are first,
that its.core-values analysis equates the Court's subjective perception of
expression with its constitutionality; and second, that as a result section
l's threshold of harm is low. The Court's perception of value and its
conception of harm interact in the following way: the value of the
expression at stake determineds the government's burden to show a
connection between its violation of section 2(b) and the prevention or
punishment of a demonstrable harm. At present, the risk of harm can
be established by direct or indirect proof, and can be inferred as a matter
of common sense.285 In addition, the harm need not be tangible: it is
sufficient that some risk of harm can be articulated, whether it has a
substantial probability of materializing, and whether it is concrete or
diffuse.286 The more pervasive, intangible, or speculative the harm,
however, the greater the risk that the government may have prohibited
2 8 4 Supra note 12.
285 See, for example, the discussion of the rational connection test in PRoMacDonald in text
accompanying notes 238-241 supra; and Carson, supra note 14 at 506-07 (stating that the relationship
under the rational connection test need not be "scientifically measurable," and can be established,
in the absence of direct proof, by reason, logic, and common sense).
286 See, for example, Butler, supra note 4 at 504 (holding that a sufficiently rational connection
is demonstrated by the "community's disapproval" of sexually explicit materials which "potentially
victimize women," and a prohibition which "restricts the negative influence which such materials
have on changes in attitudes and behaviour").
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the activity simply because of its content. To reduce that risk it is
necessary to require proof of a demonstrable harm.
Harm can arise under Oakes in one of two ways. Whether
expressive activity has undesirable consequences which invite regulation
is a factor in determining the sufficiency of the government's objective
under the first branch of the test. Perhaps in part because that analysis
is more abstract than empirical, the question of harm has resurfaced, as
a matter of evidence and proof, under the rational connection test.
There, two aspects of the test are frequently collapsed: the first, which is
exemplified by Butler and RR-MacDonald, is whether the expressive
activity is linked to a demonstrable harm; and the second, which
McLachlin J. raised in her Keegstra dissent, is whether the government's
limit will advance its goal of preventing that harm. The problem of
overlap in the Oakes test could be addressed in the following way. The
first branch should focus on the legitimacy of the government's goal;
while health, safety, or consumer protection are examples of valid
objectives, limits on expression per se, because of its content or because
of a preference for other values, are not. The rational connection test is
distinct because it is evidentiary, situational, and fact-based. There, the
government must show both that the expressive activity at stake is linked
to a demonstrable harm, and also that its limit on expressive freedom
will advance its legitimate interest in preventing or punishing that
harm.28 7
The Court's recent decisions on openness provide a good
illustration. In Carson, the Court's emphasis on the need for a sufficient
evidentiary base for any exclusion under section 486(1) of the Criminal
Code reinforced the presumption that courts should be open unless
access would cause a harm that threatens the administration of justice.
La Forest J. found that protecting the administration of justice is a
legitimate objective under branch one of Oakes and then held, on the
facts, that excluding the public from a sentencing hearing was
unnecessary because the harm to the victims' privacy interests had been
accommodated by alternative means. Meanwhile, although the Court
should have required a stronger threshold of risk, Dagenais held that a
publication ban cannot be imposed in the absence of a demonstrable
link between publicity and prejudice to the fairness of a trial. Together,
these decisions acknowledge that harm is a precondition for limits on
principles of open justice.
287 See, for example, 44 Liquornart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) [hereinafter
44 Liquormart] (invalidating a blanket prohibition on price advertising for liquor because the state
failed to show that a ban would advance its interest in promoting temperance).
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By way of contrast, all members of the Court agreed in RJR-
MacDonald that an absolute prohibition on tobacco advertising satisfied
the rational connection test, because common sense confirms that the
goal of advertising is to promote sales and thereby increase or sustain
tobacco consumption. 288 A common sense standard is inherently
problematic because the purpose of the Charter's guarantees is to
protect certain rights and freedoms from unfounded perceptions of good
and bad, value and harm, or cause and effect. Simply believing that
expression is harmful or has a bad influence is not sufficient to justify
limits under section 1 of the Charter.
In relaxing the standard of review to justify limits on low value
expression, Keegstra, Butler, and Ross may have prohibited expressive
activity in the absence of harm. Offensive expression is undoubtedly
harmful in broad, pervasive terms; by definition it violates widely
accepted and highly cherished views about the nature of social, political
and individual relationships. The question under the Charter, however,
is whether expressive activity that challenges those orthodoxies can be
restricted without evidence of a harm that transcends the general
offence to social values. If section 2(b) has any meaning, the answer to
that question must be no. Enforcing Irwin Toy's principle of freedom
does not foreclose reasonable limits on expression, but it does mean
that declaring offensive expression repugnant to other values is not a
sufficient ground for overriding section 2(b). In Ross, La Forest J. stated
that "freedom of expression serves to protect the right of the minority to
express its views, however unpopular such views may be." 289 For that
principle to resonate under section 1 the Court must incorporate
Carson's requirement of a sufficient evidentiary base into the rational
connection test's analysis of harm. Although a full consideration of the
meaning of harm under section 1 must be deferred to another time and
place, suffice to say, for the time being, that section 2(b) cannot be
compromised by a concept of harm that is diffuse, pervasive,
indeterminate or speculative.
The Court's concept of minimal impairment should also be
adjusted. As McLachlin J. indicated in mR-MacDonald, the value of the
Charter activity is irrelevant at that stage of the analysis 2 90 Structurally,
values should be identified at the beginning of the analysis to establish a
288 Supra note 9. The evidence did not establish that connection, or show that advertising is
sufficiently related to consumption to warrant an absolute ban.
289 Supra note 8.
290 Supra note 9 at 348
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framework for section 1 review. Once that framework has been
developed, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to repeat the exercise;
under the second branch of proportionality the only question is whether
the government impaired the freedom as minimally as was necessary in
the circumstances. In addition, though the standard of review can vary
under that test, as the next section explains, the requirement of minimal
impairment should be rigorously enforced when either of section l's
presumptions have been triggered. When expression is limited because
of its content, a lack of vigilance on minimal impairment would uphold
restrictions that are broader or more intrusive than necessary; banning
all tobacco ads, when those which are purely informational may not
promote consumption, is one example. A stricter standard should also
apply to absolute prohibitions because a total ban on expressive activity
is only necessary in exceptional circumstances; as Ford, Ramsden,
Dagenais, RIR-MacDonald, and Carson all show, alternative means of
achieving the government's objective with fewer or no consequences for
section 2(b) are almost always available.291
The final branch of the proportionality test has never featured
prominently in the section 1 analysis. It is the last step in a complex test
of justification pursuant to Oakes, which in many cases is undertaken
following a lengthy analysis to determine the initial question of
breach. 292 Although it is not difficult to see why this test might be
considered redundant, final proportionality should not be so easily
discounted.2 93 Especially as articulated by Lamer C.J. in Dagenais, this
branch of the section 1 analysis asks an important question. By assessing
the proportionality of its deleterious effects and salutary benefits it
considers, in direct and explicit terms, whether the consequences of the
violation are too great when measured against the benefits that may be
achieved.2 94 As such, it is the only part of the current analysis to
acknowledge the harm or cost of justifiable limits: that a constitutional
right has been violated.
291 Supra notes 9,15,12,9, and 14.
292 Although the Supreme Court has abandoned Invin Toy's two-step test under s. 2(b) in
favour of the threshold that the activity simply attempts to convey meaning, it continues to employ
and conduct a complex analysis under s. 15; see, for example, Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418;
and Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
2 93 Hogg student ed, supra note 149 at 699-700 (stating that it is a restatement of the first step
because a judgment that the effects are too severe would surely mean that the objective was not
sufficiently important to justify the limit).
2 94 Dagenais, supra note 12.
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Throughout, this article has complained that the fundamental
assumption of Oakes-that the infringement of a right must be taken
seriously under section 1-has been displaced by an undue focus on the
relative value of expressive activity. In such circumstances, a test that
assesses the cost of suppressing expressive freedom should be an
imperative part of the analysis.
With bolstering, Lamer C.J.'s deleterious effects-salutary
benefits concept can serve that function. Much like Wilson J.'s principle
of interpretation for balancing values contextually under section 1, his
proposal lacked criteria. That gap can be filled, however, by drawing on
McLachlin J.'s dissent in Keegstra. There, she stated that certain
characteristics which relate peculiarly to the nature of expressive
freedom should be included in the section 1 analysis. Her list
emphasized the underlying rationales of section 2(b)'s principle of
freedom and the potential for the infringement to have chilling effects
on constitutionally protected activity. The severity of the infringement,
and whether it imposes an absolute prohibition or a prior restraint, could
be added to that list. Basically, the purpose of the inquiry would be to
determine whether the consequences for expressive freedom are too
great, taking into account the values that would be compromised, as well
as the severity of a violation which might impose a total ban or silence
voices through its chilling effect on expressive freedom.
Ross provides an example.2 95 There, the Court removed a
teacher from the classroom for voicing offensive opinions outside the
school. Assuming that the order satisfied the other elements of Oakes,
the Supreme Court of Canada should have given the order's
consequences careful consideration under final proportionality. Doing
so would have exposed the chilling effects of imposing such a strong
sanction for views which, though highly offensive, were only tenuously
linked to incidents within the school environment. The chilling effects
on other teachers and individuals in similar positions of trust or custodial
responsibility are an imperative part of the constitutional analysis. Had
the Court undertaken that analysis, it might have found the impact on
expressive freedom to be disproportionate, and the limit unjustifiable for
that reason.
The proposal has introduced two presumptions or framework
principles for section 1 review and indicated how La Forest J.'s concept
of a "sufficient evidentiary base" can be incorporated into the Oakes
test. Left in limbo thus far is the status of the contextual approach.
295 Supra note 8.
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D. A Proposal to Hannonize Context and Principle
Despite the critique that this article has presented, it is
unrealistic, at this stage in section 2(b)'s evolution, to expect the
contextual approach to be abandoned. In any case, Wilson J.'s instinct
that context should be the basis for balancing values under section 1 is
sound. Still, it was not easy to incorporate a concept of balancing into
the structure of a test which was not designed to serve that purpose.
Instead of balance, the result was a doctrine of justification. This section
explains how the contextual approach can be adapted to address those
difficulties, to coexist with Oakes and to continue anchoring the analysis.
At present, the relationship between Oakes and the contextual
approach remains unresolved: the Court is unwilling to depart from
Oakes and its two-branch objective-proportionality test, and equally
unwilling to demand consistency in the application of that test. The
contextual approach enabled the Court to avoid and apply Oakes at the
same time, with unfortunate results both for principles of constitutional
interpretation and for the protection of expressive freedom. In light of
those results, the Court should reconsider its resistance to variable
standards of review under section 1. Some issues, such as access and the
role of the press, present context-specific questions. In other cases,
including obscenity and libel, the first generation of jurisprudence has
shown that pre-existing judge-made doctrines cannot easily be bent into
the framework of Oakes. A further problem is that the Court's early
interpretations of sections 2(b) and 1. proposed absolutes which have not
been practicable. Distinctions that were not permissible under section
2(b) could only be made under section 1. There, in the face of a
monolithic section 1 test, the contextual approach created a mechanism
for drawing distinctions but assumed, in doing so, that section 2(b) can
be adequately protected by an ad hoc assessment of particular expressive
activity. The protection of constitutional rights and differentiation of
'claims instead require a framework of principle.
Access and publicity, two pillars of the common law's principle of
openness, illustrate how context and principle can be harmonized with
Oakes under section 1. Dagenais and Carson are sound models for the
future because each harmonized context and principle by adapting the
basic concepts of Oakes to issue-specific settings. In Dagenais, Chief
Justice Lamer retooled the Oakes test to reconcile the common law
doctrine of publication bans with the Charter's guarantees of expressive
freedom and a fair trial. Moulding Oakes to the particular values at
stake produced an innovative standard of justification that is principled
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as well as contextual. By explicitly acknowledging values of openness
and accountability, and linking them to the press, Carson took that
integration of context and principle one step further. There, La Forest
J. adopted the Dagenais test, applied it to access and, in doing so,
explained how a free press advances the underlying values of section
2(b). While Carson proposed a doctrine to deal with the interface of
access and open justice, other questions, such as access to government
property or to broadcasting venues during federal election campaigns,
may require alternative solutions. For example, expressive activity on
public property was traditionally a matter of government regulation.
Although it remains unclear how such claims should be resolved under
the Charter, it is apparent that access to government property invites a
tailor-made standard of justification under section 1.296
On other questions, such as obscenity and libel law, pre-existing
doctrine does not fit neatly into the framework of Oakes. While it is
preferable, from the perspective of continuity, that existing doctrine be
preserved as much as possible, the Court cannot shirk its responsibility
to adopt the modifications that are required to protect section 2(b)'s
guarantee of expressive freedom. In doing so, the key is to develop a
standard that focuses on the values at stake, rather than on the content of
particular expressive activity. For example, instead of deciding whether
particular sexually explicit materials or defamatory statements are
valuable, the Court should ask why a constitutional guarantee protects
expressive freedom in that context, and adopt a standard of justification
which reflects an appropriate balancing of the values at stake. To
illustrate: short of a harm that is grounded in a "sufficient evidentiary
base," sexually explicit material should be free because the risk of
punishing artists and individuals for holding unconventional views about
sexuality is otherwise too great. Rather than acknowledge that diversity
of views is inherently valuable, Butler stated that materials which do not
promote true equality between male and female persons can be limited.
The Court's failure to acknowledge a section 2(b) rationale resulted in a
low threshold of harm under the rational connection test. Moreover,
while the Court upheld the Criminal Code's definition of obscenity, it
failed to see that its judge-made definition of pornography should also
be subject to constitutional scrutiny. Later, in the context of defamation,
the decision in Scientology rejected the link between criticism of public
officers and values of accountability and democratic governance. Those
2 9 6 See Commonwealth, supra note 15 at 203-04, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. (proposing issue-specific
criteria under s. 1 to determine whether government property should be regarded as a "public
arena").
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values cannot be protected, however, without modifying the common
law's principles of liability and damages. To harmonize principle and
context it would be necessary for the Court to develop a doctrine that
achieves a proportionality between expressive freedom and the
protection of reputation that is consistent with section 2(b) of the
Charter.
Context and principle can be harmonized under section 1 in the
following way. The elements of justification-including a framework of
analysis, criteria of proportionality, such as a rational connection,
minimal impairment and alternative means, and the concept of a
sufficient evidentiary base-can serve as the guideposts of review. As
long as those elements can be adjusted for context, the analysis need not
be formalistic or monolithic. For instance, although a different test may
apply in obscenity, defamation, access, and other cases, each can
incorporate the principles of justification identified above into a
standard that balances the values at stake in a particular context. The
difference between that approach and the current methodology of
section 2(b) adjudication is this: reasonable limits will not turn on
subjective perceptions of the relative value of particular expressive
activity, as they do now, but will instead be determined by a balancing of
values and principles. It is the difference between a discretion and a
rule, between an approach that essentially dismissed defamatory
statements under the Charter in Scientology, and one that moulded the
principles of justification into a section 1 doctrine that responded to the
context of openness in Dagenais and Carson. Put yet another way, it is
the contrast between the content-based assumptions of the clash model
and a methodology that seeks to balance values fairly and, in doing so, to
limit expressive freedom only when section l's principles of justification
have been proved.
Although some section 2(b) issues by their nature or legal
pedigree require distinctive standards under section 1, others, including
virtually all of those which arise under statutory provisions, are governed
by Oakes. There, the question for the future is whether that standard
should be monolithic, as originally contemplated, flexible, as proposed
by La Forest J.'s interpretation of the contextual approach, or defined by
levels or hierarchies of review, as in American doctrine. 297
297 Compare Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (reserving the strictest scrutiny for
abridgments of political expression); with Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (articulating a more relaxed standard of review in
commercial expression cases).
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For many reasons, a monolithic conception of Oakes, which
would apply the test the same way in different circumstances, has proven
unworkable. The opposite extreme, of adjusting section 1 review on an
ad hoc basis in response to perceptions about the relative worth of
expressive activity, is inconsistent with Irwin Toy's principle of freedom.
Thus far, despite the attempt in Irwin Toy to create two tiers of review,
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to entertain the third option,
which would draw distinctions between categories of expressive activity.
That approach also presents problems: any suggestion that political
expression is more important than art or advertising is hierarchical and
therefore inconsistent both with Irwin Toy's conception of section 2(b)
and the warning in Dagenais against preferring some values over others.
In addition, stratification would introduce a certain amount of rigidity
into the section 1 review. Rocket rejected a "levels" approach because
McLachlin J. feared it might constrain the judiciary's freedom to assess
the facts and circumstances of particular cases.298
As a practical reality, some hierarchy or preference between
claims is unavoidable under the Charter. Moreover, a differentiation of
claims is not necessarily inconsistent with an inclusive definition of
expressive freedom or an organic conception of justification under
section 1. For example, it is beyond peradventure that tradition and
principle support a stronger attachment to political expression than
other forms or categories of expressive activity.2 99  In such
circumstances, limits that infringe political expression should be subject
to a strict standard of justification under section 1. Chief Justice
Dickson's instinct that the guarantee's "core" should affect the section 1
analysis is sound. Once again, however, there is a fundamental
difference between the Court's core-values analysis and what is
proposed here: instead of declaring tobacco advertising, sexually explicit
material, or hate propaganda to be of low value, as members of the
Court have done, it would determine the status of expressive activity
under a standard that reflects an appropriate balancing of values. For
instance, although political expression might receive greater protection
under section I than other activities, all commercial expression would be
treated the same way; the same test would apply to professional
advertising and tobacco promotion.300 Although it cannot eliminate the
298 Rocket, supra note 9 at 246-47.
299 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 2 at 583-88.
300 But see 44 Liquormart, supra note 287 (suggesting a distinction between regulations which
protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices or require the disclosure
of information, and blanket bans on the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading commercial
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risk, treating expressive activities in the same category the sam way can
reduce the role that subjective perception plays in the constitutional
analysis. Distinctions between claims are permissible when grounded in
a rationale that is based on principle.
As for the concern that levels or hierarchies would constrain the
judiciary's assessment or introduce rigidity under section 1, constraints
on the discretion of judges and the flexibility of standards are imperative
to the enforcement of the Charter's guarantees. As a result, a levels
approach would make it more difficult to justify limits on expressive
activity. As Thomson Newspapers demonstrates, the dilution of review in
cases like Keegstra, Butler, and Ross has led to the dilution of review in all
cases. Despite its flaws, a levels approach would revive the theory of
Oakes-that constitutional violations should be taken seriously. How
many levels the Court should adopt and how much differentiation is
appropriate unfortunately cannot be addressed in the latter stages of
what is already a lengthy article. At its simplest, a levels approach might
single out political expression and make plain that limits which strike at
the core of section 2(b) require the strictest scrutiny under section 1. A
more structured approach might create nuances in the Oakes test based
on the Court's assessment of the competing values, institutional as well
as substantive, that are at stake. The important point is that, under this
proposal the analysis would take place within a framework of principle
that explains and rationalizes the underlying assumptions of section 1
review. Not only would expressive freedom be less at risk of subjective
perception, a principled basis for drawing distinctions between section
2(b) claims would promote La Forest J.'s requirement of a sufficient
evidentiary base, as well as his values of consistency and proportionality.
E. Conclusion
This part of the article has proposed the basic outline of a
methodology for the future. While it draws on the building blocks of the
first generation of jurisprudence, it unquestionably suggests significant
changes in the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to expressive
freedom under the Charter.
To summarize, its key components include the following. First is
the addition of two presumptions against content-based limits and
absolute bans on expression under section 1. By attaching consequences
to the violation of section 2(b), these presumptions of "unjustifiabiity"
draw the entitlement of the Charter's equation into the section 1 analysis
messages).
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and confirm, in unequivocal terms, that the burden to prove the
constitutionality of a violation rests with the government. Second are
adjustments to Oakes, which set a higher threshold under the elements
of the test than the standard of reasonableness that is found in much of
the current jurisprudence. Third and finally is a proposal to reconstruct
the role of context in the analysis. At present, the contextual approach
in effect licenses the courts to exercise complete discretion under section
1. As explained above, though context is a fundamental concept of
section 1 analysis, the Charter's rights and freedoms require a framework
of principle for their protection. In the circumstances, a methodology
that contextualizes section l's principles of justification can respond to
the need for issue-specific solutions without compromising the
requirement that limits on the Charter's rights and freedoms be
demonstrably justified.
Sketchy and incomplete, the proposal may well raise as many
questions as it attempts to answer. To repeat, the project has two
objectives. The first is to create a sounder structure, framework, or
foundation of principle for the section 1 analysis. Grounding the
analysis in a structure of principle can avoid, or at least minimize, the
unpredictability and inconsistency of the first generation case law. The
second is to enhance the role that section 2(b)'s values play under
section 1: to restore the equilibrium in the Charter's equation and, in
doing so, to secure a stronger place for those values in the jurisprudence.
In some instances, the methodology that is proposed here would alter
the result under section 1. Whether and to what extent it should do so
may be a matter of some debate. At the least, and far more importantly,
it will bring section 2(b)'s principle of freedom directly into the
balancing of values under section 1, as an equal partner in the Chartes
equation. Whatever the result in particular cases, that would represent a
huge step forward in the evolution of the section 2(b) jurisprudence.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
The introduction of a written charter of constitutional rights
created an extraordinary opportunity for the enrichment of Canadian
legal, social and political culture. Whatever one's views about the
wisdom of legalizing questions of rights and limits, there can be little
doubt that the Charter has challenged Canadians to articulate, debate,
and grapple with fundamental assumptions about democratic
governance. In that process, section 2(b) has been a lightning rod for
divisions about the meaning of a "free and democratic society" under a
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regime of constitutional rights. Mandated to resolve those divisions, the
Supreme Court of Canada has been intermittently bold and tentative,
granting section 2(b)'s guarantee of expressive freedom strong and even
surprising protection in some cases, only to retreat in others to a posture
of deference to the legislature. As a new generation of jurisprudence
succeeds the first, the challenge, now as much as ever, is upon us to
rethink and reconceptualize the fundamental assumptions of the section
2(b) methodology. The primary objective of this article has been to
provoke our thinking in undertaking that task.
